University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2013

Same Fight, Different Player: An Insight Into Culture, Information
Sharing, And Team Performance
Cecily McCoy-Fisher
University of Central Florida

Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
McCoy-Fisher, Cecily, "Same Fight, Different Player: An Insight Into Culture, Information Sharing, And Team
Performance" (2013). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 2558.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/2558

SAME FIGHT, DIFFERENT PLAYER: AN INSIGHT INTO CULTURE, INFORMATION
SHARING AND TEAM PERFORMANCE

by

CECILY E. E. McCOY-FISHER
B.A. Florida International University, 2001
M.S. Florida International University, 2003
M.S. University of Central Florida, 2007

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Industrial and Organizational Psychology
in the Department of Psychology
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2013

Major Professor: Barbara A. Fritzsche

© 2013 Cecily E. E. McCoy-Fisher

ii

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine the relations among culture, information
sharing, and performance among culturally-homogeneous NATO Officer teams. Forty-eight
teams participated from five countries, namely, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
USA. Teams of four participants were randomly assigned to a role and the task was an
interdependent computer-based mission using an adapted version of Neverwinter Nights™
(Bioware, 2003), where they had to communicate among teammates and with non-human players
to find weapons caches and other mission objectives. Not one individual had all of the
information needed to perform the tasks; thus, they needed to share information with each other.
The results of the study suggested that total information sharing was related to both team
performance and cultural values (Power Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance).
Specifically, Situation Update was the information sharing dimension that was significantly
related to team performance. In addition, culture moderated the relations between information
sharing and team performance. Specifically, there were hypotheses regarding Individualism
moderating the relations between (a) Supporting Behavior, (b) Information Exchange, and (c)
Reinforcement / Punishment and team performance. The results were that for high Individualists,
the more supporting behavior, the better the teams performed. For low Individualists, the more
supporting behavior, the worse the teams performed —a finding that was in the opposite
direction than hypothesized. In support of the hypotheses, for high Individualists, as Information
Exchange and Reinforcement / Punishment increased, team performance also increased.
Conversely, for low Individualists, as Information Exchange and Reinforcement / Punishment
increased, team performance decreased. A Task Direction x Power Distance interaction was also
hypothesized and supported. Task Direction was positively related to team performance for highiii

Power Distance teams. For low-Power Distance teams, an increase in task direction was
associated with a decrease in team performance. In addition, the effective teams exchanged more
information and communicated similarly during the beginning, middle, and end of the missions.
Moreover, high-Individualist teams were more successful and spent more time communicating
about Planning in the beginning, and Situation Update for both the middle and end of the task. In
contrast, teams low on Individualism spent more time communicating about Planning for all
three phases of the task. There were also interesting rank differences in Information Sharing
between senior and junior Norwegian Officers that are noteworthy. Study limitations,
contributions, and practical implications for military teams and similar career fields were
discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Currently, organizations are adopting innovative ways to restructure their organizational
layout to respond to globalization, competition, and technological advances. One commonlynoted solution is to synchronize human capital by forming teams. Teams are defined as “two or
more people assigned specific roles or functions to perform dynamically, interdependently, and
adaptively toward a common and valued goal, object, and mission” (Salas & Fiore, 2004 as cited
in Johnson et al., 2007, p. 437). Using teams, organizations have been able to accomplish
cognitively-demanding tasks that require more than one individual (e.g., decision making,
customer service; Bell, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007). The extensive use of teams in the 1990s has
resulted in flattened-organizational hierarchies, increased flexibility, and improved net profits for
the organization (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Johnson et al., 2007). To understand this new
paradigm, researchers have attempted to diagnose predictors of effective team performance.
Research conducted in recent decades have contributed to the “golden age” of team research
(Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008, p. 541), with Salas and colleagues (2007) citing as much as 130
models, frameworks, or components of teamwork. And although their presence has consumed
the industrial / organizational psychology domain, the extant models of teamwork do not
sufficiently address teams whose members are not from Western societies or teams with a
heterogeneous cultural composition (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008).
Nowhere have we seen more changes in how work is organized in response to
environmental changes than in the U. S. military. The military’s shift to smaller, highlycoordinated teams was primarily used for mission success (e.g., combat teams, training teams,
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and quality teams; Knouse, 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, Church-Payne, & Smith-Jentsch,
1998), though multinational coalition teams have proven to be more useful with the dawn of the
21st Century. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent global war on terror have
required a major shift in how the military organizes work. No longer do the missions enunciate
clear military objectives, nor is mission success solely defined by utilizing traditional weaponry
and kinetic forces to seize territory and thwart the enemy strategy in nation-to-nation warfare, as
expected in industrial war (Essens & van Loon, 2008; McGinn, Weaver, McDonald, van Driel,
& Hancock, 2008). Instead, the current military is faced with more complex missions, requiring
a new approach that involves all command levels understanding the non-U.S. political and social
challenges in influencing local leaders, governments, agencies, and Non-Governmental
Organizations to foster a trusting environment conducive to nation building (Essens & van Loon,
2008). Further, not one individual possesses all of the information, nor one nation maintains all
of the human and financial resources needed for contemporary, global military actions—thus,
coordination with internal team members and multinational networks is critical for global
warfighting and peacekeeping solutions. Examples include counterinsurgency operations,
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) missions that have been underway in Iraq and Afghanistan (Burke,
Wilson, & Salas, 2008). The primary objective of SSTR missions and the focus of the most
recent military training, is to “leave behind a stable indigenous population with the capacity to
uphold law and maintain essential services, while developing a viable market economy and
democratic political institutions” (p.497, Hughes, McCoy, & Johnston, 2009; Department of
Defense, 2005)—demanding cooperation and collaboration, most often from multinational
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coalition teams. Missions in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
have benefited from the military might of these multinational coalition teams.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, has supported coalition
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO is an alliance of 26 North American and European
countries, which was established in 1949 (www.nato.int). The mission of NATO is to
“safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means”
(www.nato.int), in accordance with the signed North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Officers
representing 12 countries (e.g., United States, United Kingdon, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy,
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Turkey, Canada, and Denmark) have supported the
Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq by assisting the Iraqi government to train,
mentor, and prepare its security forces (Zabaldo, 2004). In Afghanistan, NATO’s role is “to
assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the
country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately
through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force” (“NATO’s role in
Afghanistan”, n.d.). NATO’s operations are not narrowly focused in the Middle East. More
recently, NATO warships have been deployed off the shores of Somalia to reinforce the battle
against pirates and to protect ships from the United Nations’ World Food Program delivering
relief supplies to the country (Smith, 2010). Thus, employing military teams to collaborate with
culturally-diverse teams has been essential in maintaining an adaptive force.
Although the armed forces have transitioned to using multinational configurations, it has
underscored challenges within military operations. This change has driven researchers to shift
their attention to understanding effective multicultural collaboration. One important issue is:
how do we create effective teams when the people brought to the team have different abilities,
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knowledge, skills, and even cultural backgrounds? In this context, culturally-diverse teams
pertain to individuals from different nations joining forces, with one specific definition of
multicultural teams being “a collection of individuals, small in number, who have representatives
from more than one national background among them, who are interdependent and mutually
accountable for accomplishing a set of objectives, and who recognize themselves as a team”
(Burke, Wilson, & Salas, p. 18-1, 2008; Gibson & Grubb, 2005).
The existing research suggests that the use of heterogeneous team members can be
advantageous to problem solving and team performance. In theory, teams with diverse members
have varied perspectives, and with this skill fusion, they should be able to effectively complete
the team task (Knouse, 2001). “Diverse teams can also have greater cultural and language skills
for deployment in international settings” (Knouse, 2001, p. 4; Cox, 1993; Keller, 2001; Simons,
Pelled, & Smith, 1999; Thompson & Gooler, 1996).
Conversely, heterogeneous teams can also pose certain disadvantages to team
performance. The same diversity that can allow for divergent views for more successful decision
making can result in deficiencies in acknowledging the commonalities needed to establish
cohesion, trust, communication, and coordination (Knouse, 2001). In a nutshell, diverse teams
may find it challenging to achieve mission success and team effectiveness (for a thorough review
on the advantages and disadvantages of cultural diversity in teams, please refer to Stahl,
Maznevski, Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010 and Stahl, Mäkelä, Zander, & Maznevski, 2010).
Literature published within the past twenty-five years has found that effective team
performance is dependent, in part, upon team members engaging in efficient information sharing
(IS), which is “a central process through which team members collectively utilize their available
informational resources” (Smith-Jentsch, et al, 2001). Most of the literature on team
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performance models is derived from studies conducted in the United States and Western
populations (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). The team research to date has suggested that teams
share more information in three cases: when (a) all team members already know the information,
(b) members are all able to make accurate decisions on their own, and (c) all members are highly
similar to one another (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). These results suggest that IS is
likely to be a challenge for culturally-diverse teams.
More recent research on multicultural or multinational teams has focused on those
operating in overseas subsidiaries of multinational corporations, with participants being either
locals, expatriates, or third country expatriates (e.g., Elron, 1997); those working in
geographically distributed teams (e.g., Hinds & Mortensen, 2005); and those participating in
global virtual teams (e.g., Riopelle et al., 2003). However, to fully understand the multicultural
team dynamic, one must focus on the unique team processes that occur within each culture (e.g.,
a team of all Chinese members compared to a team composed of only Brazilian members). The
prerequisite of gaining full appreciation of heterogeneous teams is to empirically compare
homogeneous teams.
To directly compare the performance of teams from different cultures, the members of
the NATO Research Task Group 138 focusing on “Adaptability in Multinational Coalitions”
conducted a computer-based experiment using the Situation Authorable Behavior Research
Environment (BBN Technologies, 2006). Based on the computer game, “Neverwinter Nights™”,
the experiment called for 56 four-person teams of volunteer NATO Officers and the computerbased mission involved the collaboration of efforts to find simulated weapons caches while
maintaining positive relationships with the local populace portrayed by avatars. The participants
were from five countries—eight teams from Bulgaria (32 individuals), eight teams from the
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Netherlands (32 individuals), 16 teams from Norway (64 individuals), nine teams from Sweden
(36 individuals), and seven teams from the United States (28 individuals). Additionally, there
were also eight mixed-culture teams (32 individuals). The scenario was developed to represent a
true team task as the participants each had access to unshared information that would require
information sharing to achieve their shared mission. The main hypothesis proposed was that
homogeneous-culture teams perform better than mixed-culture teams. Although the preliminary
analyses have been mixed, the Research Task Group did not specifically examine information
sharing patterns (beyond frequency) among the in culturally-homogeneous teams—providing an
important research opportunity for the current study.
This study will expand the research on information sharing and team performance by
enunciating a more sophisticated understanding of how this relation is moderated by culture.
Specifically, I will examine the association between culture and information sharing in
culturally-homogeneous teams from different countries. In doing so, I will test the proposed
model that specifies that the relation between information sharing content and team performance
is moderated by Individualism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance (See Figure 1).

Culture

Information
Sharing

Team
Performance

Figure 1. The Moderated Relation between Information Sharing and Team Performance.
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The present study will examine similarities and differences in information sharing in a team
performance task using teams from different cultures, which will offer several contributions.
First, because all teams had the same team performance task, my study will be among the first to
directly compare information sharing content on performance in teams across five different
cultures. Second, because the participants are military personnel, they are a true representation of
the population to which I wish to generalize. Finally, the countries included in this study differ
on cultural values and at least one non-Western culture is represented in this sample, thereby
making it possible to begin to examine whether traditional Western notions about the relation
between information sharing and team performance apply to non-Western teams.
In Chapter 2, the literature on information sharing that is related to team performance will
be presented followed by an overview of culture in teams. Then, research examining how
culture affects team information sharing will be explained. Finally, the chapter will conclude
with a summary of the current research study.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
It was July, 1988. U. S. Naval forces operating in the Persian Gulf were already notified
from Intelligence reports that Iranians may be planning an attack on the United States around
Independence Day. These reports may have heightened the anticipation of U. S. Naval personnel
and biased their observations and perceptions of benign events that would follow.
On July 3, 1988, a helicopter operating on the USS Vincennes (a guided missile cruiser
for the Navy) reported that Iranian gunboats fired in their direction, resulting in a gun battle with
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The gun battle increased noise levels and stress among
the USS Vincennes operating personnel. In turn, a Vincennes crewmember incorrectly identified
an unknown aircraft as a threat. The aircraft was positioned within the commercial air corridor,
just not in the strictly-obeyed centerline traditionally taken by commercial planes flying in that
air space. Further, the aircraft appeared to be approaching the Vincennes. The unidentified
aircraft did not provide any data supporting its commercial status, multiple warnings were not
answered, and no changes in course were acknowledged. As a result of the correct, unknown,
and incorrect information that was shared amongst the command information center of the
Vincennes, the decision made was to fire at the aircraft. As a result, the U. S. Navy was
responsible for mistakenly shooting down an Iranian civilian aircraft over the Persian Gulf,
killing 290 passengers. The decision time span from takeoff to the disaster was only 7 minutes.
The events that led to this fatal error have been well studied to design and implement
training aimed at improving decision making under stressful situations for the military (Fogarty,
1988; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). The results of the investigation suggested that ineffective
information sharing was a cause in the poor decision.
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Many other military fatal accidents in history could be attributed to poor information
sharing, especially when coordinating among international teams. Further, current military
missions are heavily focused on stability operations, requiring increased interactions with the
local populace. Our primary intelligence sources abroad are directly linked to the ability to
negotiate, build relationships and foster trust with individuals from other cultures.
Communicating in a cross-culturally appropriate way is a crucial skill that is gaining more
research and practical attention for the U.S. military. Furthermore, international coalition teams
also operate to support the global war on terror.
Although information sharing between international team members is vital for
multinational cooperation and mission success abroad, few empirical studies have examined
differences in communication patterns among teams outside of the United States. Evaluating
how Bulgarian team members interact with each other, for example, is a critical, preliminary step
in understanding how Bulgarians would interact with teammates from Sweden, the United States,
and Norway. In other words, it is important to understand the unique, within-culture
communication patterns that are utilized among homogeneous team members before
extrapolating this information to mixed-culture teams. Thus, the primary objective of this study
is to examine information sharing patterns and team performance among culturallyhomogeneous teams from different nations. In the following literature review, I will first discuss
information sharing in teams and then introduce how culture will be expected to change this
process. These sections will provide the backbone for the study objectives and research
hypotheses.
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Teams
In the 21st Century, the United States military services have transitioned into utilizing
smaller, more highly coordinated teams (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, Church-Payne, & SmithJentsch, 1998). For clarity, a team is defined as “a distinguishable set of two or more people
who interact, dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued
goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and
who have a limited life-span of membership” (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & CannonBowers, 2000, p. 273; Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes, & Salas, 1986; Smith-Jentsch,
Mathieu, & Kraiger, 2005). Orasanu and Salas (Cox, 1993) provided the following
characteristics of a team: “(a) teams make decisions in the context of a larger task; (b) team
members have specialized knowledge and skills relevant to the task and decision; and (c) task
conditions under which teams operate often include high workload and time pressure” (van Vliet
& van Amelsfoort, 2008). Teams are most useful when the tasks are complex so that members
divide the work, monitor the performance of others, and build an expertise on some tasks
(Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).

Further, the use of teams are

advantageous in situations where, like in the military, collective insight is needed to make
effective and expeditious decisions in order to prevent errors that would lead to severe
consequences—specifically, when there are lives at stake (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). The
use of decision-making teams is supposed to increase the likelihood of selecting the most
effective decision in comparison to when the individuals are deciding a course of action without
the collaboration of a team. The major reason to expect better decision making is that members
bring different information and resources to the team. These different perspectives are then
pooled to form a team knowledge stock. With this new understanding, the team can produce a
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team decision that is of higher quality than they would have if they did not have the pooled
information (Gigone & Hastie, 1993). Consequently, sharing information among team members
is a critical process in making quality decisions. Moreover, sharing the needed information to
the right team member influences whether or not the most effective decision is chosen by the
team. The following section will discuss how the exchange of information within a team can
influence decision making and performance. Within this review, hypotheses regarding
information sharing content will be presented.
Information Sharing
Information Sharing and Team Performance
As previously stated, teams differ from groups because of their need to work
interdependently. “Although they assign roles, differentiate responsibilities, and hire members
with complementary skills, the purpose of teams is to coordinate work toward a common goal”
(Hinds & Weisband, 2003, p. 21). A plethora of research has been dedicated to understanding
how to improve team performance (see Gist, Locke, & Taylor, 1987; Mathieu, Heffner,
Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992).
The commonality among the studies is that for team members to efficiently and effectively
coordinate their efforts, they need to develop a shared understanding of both the goal and what is
needed to accomplish it (Hinds & Weisband, 2003). The initial stage in developing this shared
understanding is not possible without much explicit information sharing. Generally, decision
making teams are faced with a set of choices (e.g., to fire or not to fire at the aircraft). When
possible, the team members formally convene to discuss the alternatives and determine the final
decision. Each member usually comes to the discussion with pre-existing information about the
decision choices available. Then, the team members share their input and come to a consensus
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on the decision. “In principle, pooling information permits a group decision that is more
informed than the decisions of members acting individually” (Stasser & Titus, 1985, p. 1467).
That is, individually, people may have incomplete information—whether biased or partial, but
combining all of the team members’ information together, they can prevent errors. However,
Stasser and Titus proposed a biased sampling model of group discussion that suggests that
“group members often fail to effectively pool their information because discussion tends to be
dominated by (a) information that members hold in common before discussion and (b)
information that supports members’ existent preferences” (Stasser & Titus, 1985, p. 1467). This
group polarization effect is exaggerated when team members are performing under stressful
conditions and have to make life-or-death decisions while faced with severe time pressures—
conditions often faced by military members. Consequently, the results of the discussion usually
focus on the biases that team members hold instead of correcting their biases with other
information that are provided to the team members. Moreover, pre-discussion information will
shape the preference of one decision choice because of the increased discussion of biased
information—leading to either an effective or ineffective decision. This informational bias has
underscored the need to further understand how this phenomenon influences effective decision
making and team performance. Stasser and Titus’ (1985) study on pooling partial and biased
information has laid the foundation for contemporary research on information sharing in teams.
Stasser and Titus (1985) proposed two extreme distributions: (a) shared information—
data familiar to all group members, and (b) unshared information—data only held by one
member. Some researchers refer to these distributions as common or unique information
(Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009; Hinzs, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). The commonalityuniqueness dimension may resemble research derived from the social psychology research
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domain referred to as group polarization (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). Stasser and Titus’
information sampling model posits that the degree of shared pre-discussion information that the
team members hold will have an influence on the decision choice selected. Empirical research
has shown that team discussions consists more of shared information rather than unshared
information (Cramton & Orvis, 2003; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009; Stasser & Titus,
1985). Additionally, discussions are swayed by the present preferences of the team, that is,
dissenting information is less likely to emerge in discussions (Stasser & Titus, 1987).
Stasser and Titus’ (1985) experiment investigated the effect of information sharedness on
decision making. Specifically, they designed profiles of political candidates who were
campaigning for student body president. Each candidate’s profile contained 16 items of
information that differed in proportions of positive, neutral, and negative items (e.g.,
biographical data, academic policies, student social life, etc). The profile for Candidate A had
eight positive, four neutral, and four negative items. The authors also included two candidates
(Candidates B and C) who had four positive, eight neutral, and four negative items. Essentially,
Candidate A was the most favorable candidate. To examine if Candidate A would be selected,
the authors implemented three experimental conditions—(a) shared condition: all the information
about each candidate was shared amongst all team participants; (b) unshared/consensus: only
eight items were shared and the information presented to each team member was biased against
Candidate A and in favor of Candidate B; (c) unshared/conflict: only eight items were shared and
half of the team members received information in favor of Candidate B over Candidate C,
whereas the other team members were provided with information in favor of Candidate C over
Candidate B.
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Although the information in the unshared groups was biased toward either Candidates B
or C, the total pooled information still was in favor of Candidate A, a concept that is referred to
as hidden profiles. The participants were given these descriptions and instructed to convene in a
political caucus to determine the best candidate. The results were that the participants’
preferences before the group discussion were consistent with the biased sampling conditions and
exacerbated in the post-group discussion attitudes. Thus, group discussion simply perpetuated
initial opinions rather than correcting them. The authors also found that Candidate A was most
often chosen in the shared condition than the unshared and Candidate B was chosen more often
in the unshared conditions than in the shared conditions. Further, Candidate C was more often
chosen in unshared/conflict condition than the unshared/consensus condition. This seminal study
on sharedness of information and decision making supports that more accurate decisions are
made when more data are shared among team members.
More recently, Henningsen and Henningsen (2007) examined Stasser and Titus’
information bias and included the concept of a masked profile. In contrast to hidden profiles,
masked profiles are when the group members receive identical information about the candidate.
However, the identical information does not include the full data to make the preferential
decision. The authors provided the following example to compare hidden profiles to masked
profiles. Take a decision set of nine decision criteria, with six in favor of Option A (e.g., Items
a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) and three in favor of Option B (e.g., Items b1, b2, b3). For individuals with
full information, each team member would be provided with all nine decision items. For
individuals in a hidden profile, they would collectively have all of the information.
Hypothetically, Person X would have decision items a1 and a2, along with b1, b2, and b3. Person
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Y would have decision items a3 and a4, along with b1, b2, and b3. Person Z would have decision
items a5 and a6, along with b1, b2, and b3.
To contrast, for masked profiles, all team members would receive identical information,
but the data provided would resemble a hidden profile. For example, all individuals would
receive decision items a1 and a2, along with b1, b2, and b3. Therefore, the data support Option B,
even though Option A is the optimal alternative. Moreover, all members in the group do not
have the information to make a decision that would go against the initial decision preference bias
of Option B (Henningsen & Henningsen, 2007). When comparing full information groups (i.e.,
groups with shared information) to masked and hidden profile groups, the authors hypothesized
that the full information groups should prefer the optimal decision choice. Using a similar
experimental design as Stasser and Titus (1985), they found that the full information groups
preferred the optimal decision over the suboptimal choice before convening with the group. As
hypothesized, the opposite trend was found for both the hidden and masked profiles. The full
information groups selected the optimal candidate over the inferior, whereas the hidden profile
and masked profile groups chose the inferior candidate more often. Moreover, in the hidden
profile group, no group selected the best candidate. The results of this study not only underscore
the importance of information sharing in team decision making quality, but support that the
fewer the number of people share information, the more likely decision errors will be committed.
To further understand the information sharing-team performance relation, I lean on the
results from Mesmer-Magnus and Dechurch’s (2009) meta-analysis of 72 independent studies.
The results supported that information sharing positively predicted team outcomes—team
performance, cohesion, member satisfaction, and knowledge integration. Overall, these results,
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along with aforementioned studies, support that information sharing is important for team
decision making and performance. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Information sharing is expected to positively predict team performance.

Although there is are many studies supporting the frequency of information sharing
among teams—that is, the more information sharing that occurs among the team, the more that
the team excels—there is less support in understanding the intricacies of the information sharing
that makes it so influential on team performance. It is also important to note that as the team
becomes more familiar with the members and task, they engage in more sophisticated, implicit
coordination (Blickensderfer, Reynolds, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2010). However, for this
study, the focus is on the introductory stages of ad-hoc virtual teams, and in turn, explicit
information sharing. Therefore, it is in my interest to empirically understand what type of
information exchange is prominent for selecting a successful decision. To do so, I will examine
content of information sharing among members and hypothesize how it is expected to relate to
team performance. As the team members in this study communicated via computer, in the
following section, I will provide an overview of the literature concerning the content of
information sharing among virtual team members and how it has been referenced to impact team
performance.
Information Sharing Content in Virtual Teams
The majority of team research has been conducted among team members who interact
face-to-face in Western societies. However, with globalization in the forefront, more and more
individuals are working virtually with team members across the world. As a result of ignoring
time zones, language barriers, and traditional five day work-week, previously established team
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dynamics are changing rapidly to accommodate these new role expectations. In response, there
is an emerging literature sub-domain examining global virtual teams.
Virtual teams heavily depend on information technology—email, phone calls,
voicemail—for knowledge sharing. When team members depend on electronic mediums,
information can get lost in translation causing delays in critical problem solving, disagreements,
and frustration (Hinds & Weisband, 2003). Further, cultivating a shared mental model becomes a
challenge for virtual teams (Hinds & Weisband, 2003). Thus, effective information sharing is
even more necessary for goal accomplishment in virtual teams. Many teams within the military
now require members to interact across time zones for mission success. Thus, additional
research on how virtual teams interact is necessary to help the Warfighter. Because members of
virtual teams cannot rely on the nonverbal communication (e.g., body language) that
overwhelming represents most of communication and how individuals derive meaning through
the interaction, it is a key objective within this study to understand what information sharing
content is most influential to team performance. In the current study, the participants are
restricted to a virtual environment, thus they are limited to using only text-like communication
and email. The results of this experiment can then lead to a better understanding of information
sharing within virtual teams as they differ greatly from face-to-face teams.
Cramton and Orvis (2003) denoted that there were three content areas of information
sharing that are relevant to virtual teams—task, social, and contextual information. Task
information refers to information about the processes needed to perform the objective (e.g., how
to use a tool, what resources are available, when products or reports are due, alternative
approaches to performing the task, the status of the work). Social information is communication
about individuals and their relationships with each other (e.g., personal motives and goals,
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personality traits, where individuals grew up and were educated, their philosophical outlook).
Team members use social information to help them interpret the behavior of others. Finally,
contextual information is sharing information about the milieu or environment that surrounds
tasks, individuals, and groups. It is hypothesized that the abovementioned content areas are
important for team performance because they address both the task- and social-related aspects of
team performance. However, capturing these content areas may not be possible when the virtual
teams are ad-hoc and together for a short period of time. For example, a Marine who is directed
to work with a team to manage the transport of a day-long convoy may not have too much
opportunity to engage in the social-related information sharing. Instead, it is plausible that the
majority of the communication with his/her team may be solely focused on task-related
information sharing.
Serfaty et al developed an information-sharing content framework that can be adopted for
ad-hoc virtual teams developed for a short-term task. Their framework was three-dimensional,
including general information (e.g., time of accident), action and task (e.g., telling a teammate to
correct an error), and problem-solving and planning (e.g., reviewing the strategy to rescue
hostages). Like Serfaty et al.’s framework, Rosen’s (2010) content coding does not include the
social-related communication that is less likely to occur in ad-hoc virtual teams; however, it goes
beyond three content areas. This more recent coding system was adapted by leveraging from
past systems in the literature, specifically, Poole and Roth’s (1989) Decision Functions Coding
System. The Decision Functions Coding System (DFCS) was a combination of two others:
Bales’ (1950) Interaction Process Analysis system and Fisher’s (1970) Decision Proposal coding
System. The categories and definitions for the DFCS are found in Table 1.
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Table 1. Poole's (1989) Decision Functions Coding System

Problem Activity
Executive Activity

Communication Code
Problem Analysis
Problem Critique
Orientation
Process Reflection
Solution Analysis

Solution Activity

Solution Design
Solution Elaboration
Solution Evaluation
Solution Confirmation
Other

Tangents
Simple Agreement
Simple Disagreement

Description
Statements that define or analyze the problem
Statements that support or criticize problem analysis
Statements that direct the group's process or help the
group to do its work
Solutions or proposals
Review of issues to date, review of the design or
schedule, restatement of issues, alternatives, criteria
Statements that propose solutions
Statements that alter or amend solutions
Statements that support (+), criticize (-), or offer
evaluation (/) of solutions.
Votes or offer final confirmation of decisions
Disorganized or non-focused discussion.
Moving to an unrelated subject
Statements that express agreement
Statements that express disagreement

To accommodate his data, Rosen (2010) added two additional coding dimensions to his
adapted system: Team Information Exchange and Team Knowledge Sharing. Rosen’s final
coding system is referenced in Table 2. To summarize, Rosen (2010) reported that the only
simple linear relation found between a coding dimension and team performance was supported
by Team Knowledge Sharing—suggesting that teammates who engaged in more knowledge
sharing performed better. A finding, contradicting what is typically reported in literature (e.g.,
Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009), was a significant negative relation between Team
Information Exchange and team performance, when Simple Agreement was statistically
controlled. This finding maybe due to the coding definition of Team Information Exchange not
including Acknowledgments, in that the data would suggest that higher-performing teams have a
stronger relation between information exchange and acknowledgements than their lowerperforming counterparts. Moreover, if information exchange occurred without
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acknowledgement, this information sharing connection would weaken its association with team
performance. However, upon further examination, when the ratio of Team Information Exchange
to Team Knowledge Sharing was analyzed, he reported a significant negative relation—teams
that shared less information in proportion to knowledge sharing performed better. Other findings
from this include a positive relation between Simple Agreement and team performance and an
inverted-U curvilinear relation between Team Process and Plan Regulation and team
performance.
Table 2. Rosen's (2010) Coding System
Process
Team Information
Exchange: Sharing
relevant information with
team members

Team Knowledge Sharing:
Communicating
explanations and
interpretations of
information

Team Solution Option
Generation: Offering
potential solutions to a
problem

Code
Information
Provision
Information
Request

Knowledge
Provision

Knowledge
Request

Option
Generation–
Part

Option
Generation–
Full

Brief Description
Utterances containing facts about the task environment or
situation—simple information that can be accessed from
one source in the displays and ‘one bit’ statements.
Question utterances asking for a response of simple
information about the task environment or situation, or
questions asking for repetition of immediately preceding
information.
Statements about the task environment or situation that
provide either 1) an integration of more than one pieces of
simple information, or 2) an evaluation or interpretation of
the meaning, value, or significance of information within
the current operation.
Question utterances that request a complex information
response about the task environment or situation: to answer
the question, the response should provide either 1) an
integration of more than one piece of simple information,
or 2) an evaluation or interpretation of the meaning, value,
or significance of information within the current operation.
Statements that provide an incomplete solution—a
sequence of actions (i.e., moving resources) intended to
meet a given operation objective—or ask for further
refinement and clarification of a solution. This includes
proposing a general area for a safe base.
Statements explicitly proposing a complete or near
complete solution— a sequence of actions intended to meet
a given operation objective. A complete solution includes
locations, resources, and vehicles except for solutions
proposed for objective 2 (finding a safe location).
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Process

Code

Brief Description

Team Evaluation and
Negotiation of
Alternatives: Clarifying
and discussing positive
and negative consequences
of
potential solution options

Solution
Evaluation

Utterances that 1) compare different potential solutions on
the basis of speed, cost, or ease of execution, 2) provide
support or criticism of a single potential solution, or 3) ask
for an evaluation of a potential solution.

Goal / Task
Orientation

Team Process and Plan
Regulation: Critiquing the
team’s process

Situation
Update /
Request
Reflection
Simple Agree
/ Disagree
/Acknowledgement

Other

Incomplete /
Filler /
Exclamation

Tangent /
Off-task
Uncertainty

Utterances directing the team’s process or helping it do its
work by proposing questioning, or commenting on goals
for the team or specific actions team member’s need to take
to address a goal. These statements direct what the team
should do next or later in the future. This includes selfreferences for an individual.
Statement’s that provide or ask about what the team is
currently doing or what is currently happening with the
simulation.
Utterances that provide or ask for a critique or evaluation of
the performance of the team as a whole or of individual
members.
Simple agreement/disagreement utterances are expressions
of agreement or disagreement with no rationale provided.
Acknowledgements are utterances providing recognition of
receipt of communication.
Incomplete utterances are statements that have no explicit
meaning because they are missing one or more critical
components of grammar: subjects, verbs, or objects.
Fillers are sounds or words that are spoken to fill gaps
between utterances.
An exclamation is an utterance that has no grammatical
connection to surrounding utterances and emphatically
expresses emotion.
Non-task related statements including jokes, sarcastic
comments, comments on the nature of the experiment, and
statements that have nothing to do with the task at hand.
Uncertainty statements explicitly express either general or
specific uncertainty about the roles, tasks, situations, or
anything else task-related.

Although there is much strength to the Rosen (2010) study, the research is still unclear on
which information sharing content is most influential for team performance, providing the slight
inconsistencies in research. Thus, the following exploratory research question is proposed:
Research question: Which information sharing content area(s) relate to team
performance?
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Further, the literature has not addressed whether and how cultural context may shift or
change the relations altogether. More specifically, do the data support that cultural values
moderate the relation between information sharing and team performance? Thus, in this study, I
will examine how culture may relate to information sharing and team performance. In turn, a
review of literature on culture follows.

Culture
As in civilian corporations, NATO operations often involve international collaboration
and intercultural interactions with allied countries. This is the current reality for American
corporations as well, due to the dependence on international employees, customers, suppliers,
and competitors (Javidan, Dorfman, de Luque, & House, 2006). To expand how the globalized
market has been affected, “foreign sales by multinational corporations have exceeded $7 trillion
and are growing 20 percent to 30 percent faster than their sales of exports” (Javidan et al., 2006,
p. 67). Although the need to operate in multicultural environment to remain competitive mirrors
that of the military, the consequences of not understanding the culture of other nations for
servicepersons operating abroad, and in multicultural teams, are often more critical, and
sometimes, life-threatening. Thus, there is a need to research how national cultural differences
influence organizational and team processes and outcomes.
It has been noted by many researchers that “culture affects our knowledge structures,
beliefs, and how we understand the world around us, make attributions, behave, communicate,
etc.” (12-1, Bjornstad; Hewstone, 1989; Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, 2001; Javidan, et al., 2006;
Miller, 1984; Smith & Bond, 1993; Triandis, 1976; Triandis, Vassiliou, Vassiliou, Tanaka, &
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Shanmugan, 1972). It is a “unique meaning and information system, shared by a group, and
communicated from one generation to the next” (Matsumoto, 2009, p. 12; Matsumoto & Juang,
2007). Moreover, cultural differences can affect the overall military mission success at both the
commanding and platoon levels. Working at both levels requires seamless interactions and
negotiations with the local population, authorities, law enforcement, and military personnel.
Failure to gain the trust of the people can result in compromised intelligence information,
increased insecurity, unwarranted danger, and overall mission jeopardy (Van Meer, Veldhuis, &
Schwerzel, 2008). Knowledge and fluency in the host country culture is necessary to win the
hearts and minds of the people and to facilitate partnerships, cooperation, and coalitions (Van
Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel, 2008). Furthermore, a concrete awareness of culture should be
engaged by both military and non-military teams that are involved in multinational operations.
Defining Culture
One challenge in culture research is discriminating between cultures. The root of the
struggle has been identified as the definition of culture – it has continuously changed over time
and across disciplines (i.e., psychology, anthropology, and sociology domains). Most people
have an idea of what ‘culture’ is, with connotations ranging from literature, education, and the
arts to what anthropologists refer to patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting (Smith, 2008;
Hofstede, 1991). Hofstede refers to the former as ‘culture one’—“culture in the narrow sense”
and the latter as ‘culture two’ (Hofstede, 1991, p. 5). The focus of this study will be exploring
‘culture two’.
Arriving at a single definition of culture becomes even more difficult because there are
many forms of culture—such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, region, language, geographical
area, ecology, age, hobbies, lifestyles, strength of kinship bonds, social class, and corporate
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culture (Cohen, 2009; Smith, 2008; Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Thus, the culture
definition used varies from study to study. Consequently, readers interested in influences of
“culture” on various outcomes can be easily misled.
Many definitions of culture have been offered, all developed from the Latin derivation
referring to the “tilling of the soil” (p.4, Hofstede, 1991). Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952)
gathered 164 definitions of culture (please see Table 1 for an abridged list of culture definitions).
After more than five decades since the Kroeber and Kluckhohn compilation, more definitions
have been offered. The most referenced authors in the cross-cultural domain are Hofstede,
Kluckhohn, and Triandis, with each researcher providing their own perspective on culture.
Hofstede (1991) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes
the members of one group or category of people from another” (p. 5). Kluckhohn’s (1951)
definition was that “culture consists in patterns of thinking, feeling, and reacting…” (p.86).
Triandis (2004) specified that culture develops in adaptive interactions, it includes
commonalties, and it is shared through time and generations. Hofstede’s definition focuses on
the cognitive facets, whereas Kluckhohn includes cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of
culture in his definition. Triandis concentrates on the ascribed function of culture—that it is
learned and shared over time. In total, culture is a “(a) collective, not individual attribute, (b) not
directly visible but manifested in behaviors, and (c) common to some but not all people”
(Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).
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Table 3. Definitions of Culture

Sources

Definition

Fiske (2002, p.85)

A culture is a socially constructed constellation consisting of such things
as practices, competencies, ideas, schemas, symbols, values, norms,
institutions, goals, constitutive rules, artifacts, and modifications of the
physical environment.

Boyd & Richerson (1985, p.
33)

Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ phenotypes
which they acquire from other conspecifics by teaching or imitation.

Lumsden (1989, p.15)

A system of socially learnable knowledge shared among members of a
society.

Smith & Bonds (1999, p. 39)

A culture is a relatively organized system of shared meanings.

Hofstede (2001, p. 1)

“The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the
members of one group or category of people from another”

Kluckhohn

Culture consists in patterns of thinking, feeling and reacting, [..]; the
essential core of culture consists of traditional [..] ideas and especially
their attached values”.

Matsumoto (Hughes et al.,
2009)

“A unique meaning and information system, shared by a group, and
communicated from one generation to the next”.

Shiraev and Levy (2007)

Culture is “a set of attitudes, behaviors, and symbols shared by a large
group of people and usually communicated from one generation to the
next” (p. 4).

Each of the aforementioned definitions still oversimplifies the sophistication that this
construct denotes. To capture the complexity, researchers have identified dimensions of culture
to refine and test the construct. In the following section, I will provide an overview of the
cultural frameworks most often cited in the literature.
Cultural Frameworks
It has been documented that people from different cultures behave differently.
Researchers have dedicated effort to diagnosing the important variables that leads to behavioral
differences. In doing so, they have developed various cultural frameworks; detailing aspects of
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culture that have been theorized to have relations with behavior (please see Table 4 for a list of
different cultural frameworks). Within the past five years, there have been at least 45 cultural
dimensions identified in the literature; however, providing details about each dimension is
beyond the scope of this study (please see Salas, Burke, Wilson-Donnelly, & Fowlkes, 2004 for
an overview). The most widely accepted dimensions of culture were those developed by
Hofstede (1980), but many frameworks have followed, some of which will be discussed further,
namely those from Trompenaar, Schwartz, the GLOBE project, and the Cultural Mosaic.
Hofstede’s Cultural Values
Arguably, the most researched cultural dimensions are Hofstede’s five cultural
dimensions— Power Distance, Individualism / Collectivism, Masculinity / Femininity,
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation. This seminal research that
spearheaded the original four dimensions (excluding Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation,
which was added in the late 1980s) was conducted by Geert Hofstede by analyzing data from
IBM employees from 40 countries (Hofstede 1984; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Power Distance
is the degree to which unequal power distribution in a society is tolerated (Hofstede, 2006;
Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001). Specifically, it is the extent to which the less powerful
members of society accept and expect that there is an unequal distribution of power (Hofstede,
1980; 1991). The Individualism / Collectivism dimension is the most researched cultural
dimension from Hofstede’s framework, focusing on the extent to which individuals are
integrated into groups. In more individualistic societies, there is more importance placed on
protecting the self and immediate family. In contrast, collectivist cultures emphasize being a part
of a cohesive group and looking after members of an extended family “in exchange for
unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004, p. 63; Hofstede, 1980; 1991). Masculinity /
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Femininity is a continuum indicating the distribution of gender roles, with the assertive pole
named “masculine” and the modest, caring pole named “feminine” (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).
Moreover, it is the extent to which stereotypical masculine objectives of wealth, assertiveness,
competitiveness, and recognition are esteemed instead of focusing on modesty and caring for
others (Hofstede, 1980; 1991; Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi, 2005).
Uncertainty Avoidance refers to the tolerance for risk and ambiguity (Hofstede & McCrae;
Paulus, et al., 2005). Cultures that score high in uncertainty avoidance attempt to minimize
ambiguous situations by implementing strict laws and safety/security precautions. Individuals
living in uncertain avoiding cultures are often more expressive and anxious and tend to be
viewed as more “busy, fidgety, emotional, aggressive, active” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 115). LongTerm / Short-Term focuses on “fostering virtues that are oriented toward future rewards versus
emphasis on immediate gratification” (Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi,
2005, p. 44). Long-Term Orientation suggests an inclination for planning whereas short-term
orientation indicates a tendency for action (Lichacz, 2008).
Trompenaar’s Waves of Culture
Hofstede’s study sparked additional cross-cultural studies examining differences in
behavior. Trompenaars conducted research on over 30,000 managers representing 30
multinational corporations from 55 countries. His work resulted in a similar taxonomy of values
that was proposed by Hofstede, however, he provides additional insight on a couple of
dimensions (i.e., dividing power distance into status that is warranted by achievement or by
inherited by birth). Trompenaars’ cultural framework has seven dimensions, each posing their
own dilemma—Universalism – Particularism (what is more important – rules or relationships?),
Individualism – Communitarinism (do we function in a group or as an individual?), Specific –
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Diffuse cultures (how far do we get involved?), Affective – Neutral cultures (do we display our
emotions?), Achievement – Ascription (do we have to prove ourselves to receive status or is it
given to us?), Sequential – Synchronic (do we do things one at a time or several things at once?),
and Internal – External Control (do we control our environment or work with it?). Due to the
overlap with Hofstede’s Big Five (e.g., Trompenaars’ Communitarism and Hofstede’s
Collectivism), Trompenaars’ framework allows for more feasible conceptual integration (Carr,
2004) with Hofstede’s empirically-supported framework, reinforcing the maintenance of
Hofstede’s dimensions in cultural research.
Schwartz Value Survey
Most of the cross-cultural research has used business managers and personnel for their
sample to help generate their dimensions. However, Schwartz (Thompson & Gooler, 1996)
provided a paradigm shift from the conventional method. He investigated value preferences of
secondary school teachers and students from 64 nations (www. imointernational.de/index_englisch.htm?/englisch/html/svs_info_en.htm). His rationale for using this
sample instead of managers was that the classroom is a central location where cultural values are
passed on. The results of the Schwartz Value Survey yielded ten individual-level motivational
values and goals and seven cultural orientations. The ten cultural orientations include
conservatism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, mastery, and
harmony. Details about these cultural orientations are featured in Table 4. Again, Schwartz’
framework has yet to replace Hofstede’s name on the cultural framework marquee.
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The GLOBE Project
Similar to previous cross-cultural studies, the researchers for the Global Leadership and
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness project examined approximately 20,000 managers in over
60 countries, ranging from Albania to Zimbabwe (Javidan & House, 2001; Grove, 2005). The
results from the project yielded nine ecological factors that are related to leadership behavior.
The factors are Performance Orientation, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Human Orientation,
Institutional Collectivism, In-group Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Power Distance, and
Uncertainty Avoidance (see Table 4 for more details on each dimension). Some of these
dimensions echo those from Hofstede’s Big Five (e.g., power distance and uncertainty
avoidance); however, integration of study results should be cautioned as the criterion for the
GLOBE project was leadership behavior instead of general work behavior. Nonetheless, the
overlap in dimensions supports consistency in the research across different methodologies,
nations, and criteria.
The Cultural Mosaic
The most comprehensive framework of culture is Chao and Moon’s (2005) Cultural
Mosaic. In essence, they describe a person’s or a nation’s culture as being comprised of multiple
tiles—demographic, geographic, and associative characteristics (more details are found in Table
3). Although the Cultural Mosaic encompasses a multidimensional approach to the culture
construct, it has not yet been empirically validated.
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Table 4. Cultural Frameworks
Source

Framework



Hofstede (1980) –
Cultural Values







Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner
(2005)






Power distance: the prevailing norms of inequality within a culture.
Individualism – Collectivism: the extent to which the identity of members of a given culture is shaped
primarily by personal choices and achievements of by the groups to which they belong.
Masculinity – Femininity: in masculine cultures, values such as “competition, success, and performance are
relatively more prevalent than in feminine cultures, where there is relatively more emphasis on values such as
warm social relationships, quality of life, and care of the weak.
Uncertainty Avoidance: the degree to which members of a culture are uncomfortable with uncertainties in life.
Long-term orientation – Short-term orientation: fostering virtues that are oriented toward future rewards
versus emphasis on immediate gratification
Universalism versus Particularism – “people from universalistic cultures focus more on rules, are more
precise when defining contracts and tend to define global standards for company policies and human resources
practices. Within more particularistic national cultures, the focus is more on the relationships; contracts can be
adapted to satisfy new requirements in specific situations and local variations of company and human
resources policies are created to adapt to different requirements.”
Individualism and Communitarinism – “this dimension classifies countries according to the balance between
individual and group interests. Generally, team members with individualist mindsets see the improvements to
their groups as the means to achieve their own objectives. By contrast, the team members from communitarian
cultures see the improvements to individual capacities as a step towards the group prosperity”.
Specific versus Diffuse Cultures – “Specific cultures exhibit more ‘directness’, whereas diffuse cultures are
more indirect and have blurred boundaries (e.g., work and leisure).”
Achievement versus Ascription – “people from achievement-oriented countries respect their colleagues based
on previous achievements and the demonstration of knowledge, and show their job titles only when relevant.
On the other hand, people from ascription-oriented cultures use their titles extensively and usually respect
their superiors in hierarchy.”
Neutral versus Affective – “In affective cultures, the expression of emotion by individuals is taken as more
natural and indeed admired by others in these cultures. On the other hand, in neutral cultures, the expression
of emotion is restrained to give the impression of objectivity and ‘being in control’”.
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Source

Framework






Schwartz Value
Survey
Seven Cultural
Orientations and Value
Types








Conservatism: the person is viewed as embedded in a collectivity, finding meaning in life largely through
social relationships and identifying with the group. A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo,
propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order.
(Social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom).
Intellectual Autonomy: the person is an autonomous, bounded entity and finds meaning in his / her own
uniqueness, seeking to express own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings) and is encouraged to do so.
Intellectual Autonomy has a cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their
own ideas and intellectual directions (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity).
Affective Autonomy: the person is an autonomous, bounded entity and finds meaning in his/her own
uniqueness, seeking to express own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings) and is encouraged to do so.
Affective Autonomy promotes and protects the individual’s independent pursuit of own affectively positive
experience (pleasure, exciting life, varied life).
Hierarchy: a hierarchical, differential allocation of fixed roles of resources is the legitimate, desirable way to
regulate interdependencies. People are socialized to comply with the obligations and rules sanctioned if they
do not. A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (social
power, authority, humility, wealth).
Egalitarianism: individuals are portrayed as moral equals, who share basic interests and who are socialized to
transcend selfish interests, cooperate involuntarily with others, and show concern for everyone’s welfare
(equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty). People are socialized to as autonomous rather than
interdependent because autonomous person have no natural commitment to others (equality, social justice,
freedom, responsibility, honesty).
Mastery: groups and individuals should master, control, and change the social and natural environment
through assertive action in order to further personal or group interest. A cultural emphasis on getting ahead
through active self-assertion (ambition, success, daring, competence).
Harmony: the world is accepted as it is. Groups and individuals should fit harmoniously into the natural and
social world, avoiding change and self-assertion to modify them (unity with nature, protecting the
environment, world of beauty).
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Source

Framework


Chao & Moon (2005)
– Cultural Mosaic






Six Dimensions of
National Culture (Sutton & Gundling,
2005)







World Values
Survey



Demographic tiles of the cultural mosaic – inherited physical characteristics and social identities (e.g., age,
ethnicity, gender, race)
Geographic tiles of the cultural mosaic – physical characteristics of the land (natural or man-made) that can
influence group identities (e.g., climate, temperature, coastal/inland, urban/rural, regional/country)
Associative tiles of the cultural mosaic – all groups (informal and formal) with whom the person identifies
(e.g., family, religion, employer, profession, politics, avocations).
Independence / Interdependence: Shapes a preference for individual initiative and action, or for a more
group-oriented approach emphasizes the interests of the team as a whole
Egalitarianism / Status: Shapes a preference for mutual consultation in decision-making, or for greater
deference to rank and hierarchy
Risk / Restraint: Shapes a preference for rapid action and risk-taking, or for more cautious and calculated
actions based on ample information
Direct / Indirect: Shapes a preference for open and explicit communication, or for careful attention paid to
context or to implicit meanings in a given message
Task / Relationship: Shapes a preference for immediate attention to getting the job done, or for establishing
strong and trusting personal relationships first
Short-term / Long-term: Shapes a preference for making choices based upon a narrow time horizon, or for
considering the impact that choices will have over a longer span of time
Traditional / Secular-Rational: “…[this] dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is
very important and those in which it is not… Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of
parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and
reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride, and a
nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these
topics” (www.worldvaluessurvey.com).
Survival / Self-Expression: “The unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the
past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted.
Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an
increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life”
(www.worldvaluessurvey.com).
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Source

Framework




Global Leadership
and
Organizational
Behavior
Effectiveness
(GLOBE)








Performance Orientation: “the degree to which a collective encourages and rewards (and should encourage
and reward) group members for performance improvement and excellence.”
Assertiveness: “the degree to which individuals are (and should be) assertive, confrontational, and aggressive
in their relationships with others.”
Future Orientation: “the extent to which individuals engages (and should engage) in future-oriented behaviors
such as delaying gratification, planning, and investing in the future.”
Human Orientation: “the degree to which a collective encourages and rewards (and should encourage and
reward) individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others.”
Institutional Collectivism: “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage
and reward (and should encourage and reward) collective distribution of resources and collective action.
In-group Collectivism: “the degree to which individuals express (and should express) pride, loyalty, and
cohesiveness in their organizations or families.”
Gender Egalitarianism: “the degree to which a collective minimizes (and should minimize) gender inequality.
Power Distance: “the degree to which members of a collective expect (and should expect) power to be
distributed equally.”
Uncertainty Avoidance: “the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies (and should rely) on
social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate unpredictability of future events.”
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Source

Framework





Cultural Lens
Model







Time Horizon: “…describes how far ahead people set goals and look to justify their actions” (Klein, 2004, p.
12).
Achievement vs. Relationship: “For achievement groups, work related activities are a central focus and
accomplishment a defining goal” (Klein, 2004, p. 15). “In relationship groups, cultures, interpersonal
dynamics, and nurturing relationships are central focus” (Klein, 2004, p. 15).
Mastery vs. Fatalism: “A mastery orientation is based on the belief that people are dominant over nature and
can control their environment” (Klein, 2004, p. 13). “Those who hold a fatalistic orientation respect the
external factors that control their lives” (Klein, 2004, p. 13).
Tolerance for Uncertainty: “…describes how people function in the face of uncertainty” (Klein, 2004, p.
17).
Power Distance: “…describes the extent to which all members in a group expect and accept that power will be
distributed unevenly” (Klein, 2004, p. 16).
Hypothetical vs. Concrete Reasoning: “Hypothetical thinkers use mental representations of future events to
consider alternate outcomes” (Klein, 2004, p. 18). “People who engage in concrete reasoning respect the
constraints imposed by context and carefully integrate those constraints into their thinking” (Klein, 2004, p.,
18).
Attribution: “…focuses attention and narrows the selection criteria for approaches or remedies” (Klein, 2004,
p. 19)
Differentiation vs. Dialectical Reasoning: “Differentiation reasoners work to understand contradictions by
separating, analyzing, and evaluating distinct qualities” (Klein, 2004, p. 20). “Dialectical reasoners evaluate
ideas by seeking their connections rather than sharpening distinctions” (Klein, 2004, p. 20).
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Cultural Framework for this Study
There have been many cultural frameworks proposed (see Table 4) in the literature over
the years; however, Hofstede’s five domains have been the most widely used by researchers, but
it is not without criticism. First, the dimensions were developed based on data from employees
within one organization—IBM. Even though there were participants from various countries, the
employees worked in a U. S. multinational organization. “Individuals who work for an
American multinational are likely to have been carefully chosen for their ability to adapt to
American policies/procedures, and undoubtedly work in an environment that is somewhat
different from that in locally owned companies” (Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001, p. 280). So,
the data may reflect the culture variation within one [American] organization (hence, controlling
for organizational differences) and may be different if the employees were representing local
organizations. Second, the data from the Hofstede study were collected almost 30 years ago
(Smith, 1992); it is plausible that cultural values have shifted over time. Nations change over
time and due to access and exposure to new ideas and knowledge (Klein, 2004). This may have
implications for the construct validity of the dimensions, as there has been less agreement with
the original results from later studies (Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001). Another concern
related to the original study is that Hofstede reported the means for the countries—undermining
the variation within each country (Smith, 1992). Also, there may be more between-nation
variation that may have been missed because they were not featured in Hofstede’s questionnaire.
The final critique is that there are gender differences observed for the MF scale, leading to
disagreement with the original Hofstede data simply due to the gender composition of the
participants.
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Although the criticisms cannot be ignored, Hofstede’s VSM-94 provides many
contributions that have proliferated cultural research. “Hofstede’s concepts continue to provide
the best available basis for thinking about cross-national differences in many aspects of
organizational performance” (Smith, 1992, p. 41). For the past three decades, the Hofstede
dimensions have been the most featured and researched cultural framework for countless studies
and across career fields. To date, it is the only known culture operationalization that has been
validated in over 70 countries. And although other frameworks have been theorized since then
(e.g., the Cultural Mosaic), they do not have the empirical support as does Hofstede’s five
dimensions. Thus, for this study, I will focus on Hofstede’s dimensions as the operationalization
of cultural values. In applying cultural dimensions in research, many authors have chosen to use
nationality as a proxy for culture to investigate cultural frameworks shown to relate to behavior.
This strategy will be discussed in turn.
Nationality as a Proxy for Culture
Traditionally, researchers have focused on a top-down approach to studying culture,
targeting aggregated levels of analysis, like the individuals’ nationality, which serves as a
simplistic conceptualization aimed at describing a multidimensional construct (e.g., Chao &
Moon, 2005). Nationality is considered an alternative for studying culture because, generally,
individuals from the same country often use the same language, have a similar history, share a
geographic location; thus, they are assumed to share a “foundation on which a culture can
emerge and maintained” (Smith, 2008). Also, research has supported that national culture
accounted between 25 and 50 percent of variation in attitudes (Burke, Wilson, & Salas, 2008;
Gannon, 1994).
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Although using nationality is convenient and a common practice, there is one main
shortfall –underestimating the diversity within the country (Matsumoto, 2003). As a result,
researchers also collect and report demographic information to measure the similarities and/or
representativeness of the country’s participants.
Though using nationality as culture’s surrogate presents this weakness, it is a practical
measure for basic cultural research. Understanding the basic cultural dynamics among
teammates is vital—that is, how people from different nationalities interact with each other in
teams. More specifically, do Americans working in teams with other Americans interact
differently than teams solely composed of individuals from Bulgaria? The answers to these
questions regarding the expectations of homogeneous team interactions can then be used to
develop research hypotheses and practical recommendations for heterogeneous team interactions.
In this study, the participants are from Bulgaria, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the
United States. After examining the most recent culture values from these and neighboring
countries, it provided more support for their inclusion and national-level comparisons.
Although cross-cultural psychology researchers often focus on the national level of culture, they
operationalize the construct via underlying, empirically-supported values (e.g., Hofstede’s
cultural values). For example, House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) examined
the societal practice and value scores of In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty
Avoidance in the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) study.
Of the five countries examined in this study, the GLOBE researchers examined the cultural
differences among the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U. S. The countries’ scores on In-Group
Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance were banded into separate groups
based on mean scores. For In-Group Collectivism practice scores, all three countries were
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banded together; however, their value scores (index analogous to Hofstede’s values) were all
separated in different bands (see Appendix B for GLOBE study values). For Power Distance,
the U. S. and Sweden were banded together and separated from the Netherlands for both their
practice and value scores. Finally, the Netherlands and the U. S. were banded together for
Uncertainty Avoidance practice scores. This pattern was not mirrored in their value scores as all
three countries were in separate bands for their value scores. The results of this study provide
support for using nationality as a proxy for culture, especially for the countries included in this
study. Moreover, nationality accounted for 25% to 50% of variance in attitudes (Burke, Wilson,
& Salas; Gannon, 1994). However, nationality is considered the outer layer of culture with the
underlying cultural values as a deeper layer. Thus, an examination of the cultural values that
have sustained the literature over time will be further discussed in the following section.

Cultural Values and Teams
In the current study, the teams were composed of Military Officers from the same nation.
The cultural values developed by Hofstede are well suited for this study as they originated with
the purpose of targeting nationality differences and have been linked to team processes and
outcomes. In this study, only Individualism – Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty
Avoidance will be considered, with explanations of their inclusion in the sections that follow.
For collectivism, there is an identity of “we”, which would lend a more conducive environment
for team processes and outcomes. Bond and Smith (Thompson & Gooler, 1996) reported that
Individualism / Collectivism and Power Distance statistically predicted compliance with group
norms beyond various demographic variables (Bond & Smith, 1996; Carr, 2004). Of all
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance were cited as the
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two that can hinder group performance (Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi,
2005; Van Hook, 2000). However, Hofstede (1991; 2001) stressed that only Power Distance
holds influence on team relationships (Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi,
2005). House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) clarified a possible theoretical
relation between Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance. The authors stated
that collectivism may be an uncertainty avoidance strategy, that is, with more people they can
overcome any uncertainty presented—“united we stand, divided we fall” (p. 625). In support of
these proposed relations, Hofstede reported a significant negative correlation between UAI and
Individualism (r = -.35, p < .05, across 40 countries; 1984, p. 213; House, Hanges, Javidan,
Dorfman, and Gupta, 2004, p. 625). Further, the GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance practices and
Institutional Collectivism practices were positively related (r = .40, p < .01, across 61 cultures;
House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004, p. 626). Also, the GLOBE study authors
posited that presenting structure, organization, rules and protocol may be a defense for
uncertainty, such that when faced with a novel dilemma, expectations are already in place to
address the situation. The authors also noted a strong negative correlation between GLOBE
Uncertainty Avoidance practices and Power distance values. This finding suggests that highlystructured societies no longer support power hierarchies in their current practices. Most
importantly, Sutton, Pierce, Burke, and Salas (2006) stated that three cultural dimensions
influence multicultural teamwork: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Individualism /
Collectivism. The relations among Individualism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance
will be examined in this study in order to explore whether the relations among these variables
reflect those of Hofstede three decades later.
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Although this study provides a valuable opportunity to explore three of Hofstede’s
culture variables as they relate to team performance, two of his culture variables, Long-Term /
Short-Term Orientation and Masculinity / Femininity, will not be examined. Long-term
orientation will be excluded because the team task was a short-term task. Masculinity/Femininity
is excluded because I do not expect a large amount of variability on Masculinity/Femininity in a
sample of male NATO officers. Thus, in the following section, I will summarize the research on
the influences of Individualism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance on information
sharing and team performance.
Cultural Dimensions, Information Sharing and Team Performance
Culture and Information Sharing
To date, there are few empirical studies examining the contributors to communication in
multicultural teams (Riedel, 2008). “However, understanding the differences in world views
between cultures is essential to good communication” (p. 6-4). Klein and Steele-Johnson (2002)
conceptualized the Cultural Lens Model, which posits that life experiences (with families and the
environment) shape how people think, their perceptions of the world, and interactions with
others. According to the authors, in general, people from the same national culture share a
cultural lens –having the tendency to view the world in a similar way. Thus, the cultural lens
provides significance in how people understand others’ words, gestures, and intentions when
communicating that goes beyond language barriers (Riedel, 2008). Further, it should be
expected that individuals working within homogeneous teams should have less
miscommunication because, not only is language not an issue, they share a similar cultural lens.
People within a culture tend to adopt the attitudes, customs, and beliefs characteristic of their
culture (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-5). Studying these homogeneous teams from various countries will
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provide (a) empirical support for understanding how other cultures communicate in teams and
(b) implications for working in multicultural teams.
Triandis (2000) contends that the cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1980) and
those of others “are important in communication because a culture’s position on the dimensions
influences cues in the communication interaction to which the person pays attention” (Riedel,
2008, p. 6-6). One of the problems that lead to miscommunication in multicultural
environments is information sharing—thus, it is important to see how homogeneous teams
exchange information. “A problem that plagues [multinational teams] is the inability or
unwillingness of team members to share mission-related information with team members of
other cultures” (p. 6-3). Assuming this is true, could it not be assumed that teams with lower
variance in cultural values would engage in more information sharing than in teams with greater
variance? Additionally, would there be more unique, rather than open, information sharing
occurring? Will differences across cultures in information sharing yield similar team
performance? The answers to these questions will help in understanding the role of culture with
information sharing in homogeneous-culture teams.
As previously mentioned, a lack of information sharing within teams has been shown to
degrade the quality of mental models and jeopardize mission success. But, can it be possible that
some cultures do not engage in active verbal information exchange in ad-hoc teams and still
attain mission success? I will examine the basic communicative interaction patterns within
teams from five different cultures, describing how the patterns differ across cultures, and they
relate to team performance. In the following sections, I will provide an overview of how
Hofstede’s Individualism-Collectivism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions
are expected to relate to information sharing in teams.
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Individualism – Collectivism: Me Versus We
The Individualism-Collectivism cultural continuum has received the most research
attention across disciplines (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1986).
Its attention has accelerated and pressed researchers to revisit the construct. As a result,
Individualism and Collectivism constructs have been coined and tested—“Gesellschaft” and
“Gemeinschaft” (Tonnies, 1887; 2002), “Agency” and “Communion” (Bakan, 1966),
“Independent” and “Interdependent” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sutton & Pierce, 2003) . The
premise of this dimension is that in different societies, there is more emphasis on the role of the
individual as compared to the needs of the group (Hofstede, 1980). Hofstede refers to societies
that give priority to the group as collectivist, and those who cater to the individual as
individualist. Interestingly, the vast majority of the world’s population lives in collectivist
cultures, where it is expected that children are raised with their extended family. Within the
collectivist cultures, the power is deferred to the group. “Group membership in a collectivist
culture is much less a matter of choice than in an individualist culture, whether that choice be
determined by one’s family of origin or by the organization for which one works” (Smith, 1992,
p. 41). Hence, decisions are made in the interest of the collective. Therefore, in teams, the
accountability in collective societies is for the team (Hofstede, 1980).
On the contrary, in individualist societies, children are raised with their close family
members—parents and siblings—referred to as the nuclear family. There is less contact with
extended family members, therefore a reduced concern for these individuals. Individuals in
these cultures are expected to be accountable for only themselves, with less regard for others if
working on a team. Team objectives maintain clear individual responsibilities, so that when
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team performance is sub-par, it is evident where the responsibility lies. As implied, the power is
deferred to the person in individualist teams. Further, when team decisions are being made, each
team member is concerned about self-promotion. (Hofstede, 1980).
Some research has regarded the IC dimension as the most important cultural dimension
that explains differences, as well as similarities, in communication (Gudykunst & Mody, 2002;
Riedel, 2008). There are some theories developed in the social psychology literature that will
lend support for the I-P-O model and hypotheses presented in this study, specifically Social
Identity Theory, Low- versus High-Context Cultures, and Direct and Indirect Communication.
Each will be detailed in the following paragraphs.
Social Identity Theory. According to Myers (2005), individuals not only consider
personal identity in their self-concept, but also define themselves by their groups. For example, I
consider myself as a woman, a Belizean-born US citizen, a classically-trained dancer, a UCF
PhD student, and a daughter in the McCoy family. People carry similar group identities when
answering “Who am I?”. Social identity theory suggests that three trends occur: (a)
categorization, (b) identification, and (c) comparison. During categorization, people place labels
on others to reduce cognitive overload; that is, saying someone is a PhD student or an American
provides inferences about the person’s qualities. When identifying people, individuals are
connected to certain groups, considered the in-group. As a consequence, individuals compare
themselves with other groups (out-groups), resulting in more favorable evaluations of those
within the in-groups:
“Having a sense of ‘we-ness’ strengthens our self-concepts. It feels good. We seek not
only respect for ourselves but pride in our groups” (Myers, 2005, p. 351; Smith & Tyler,
1997).
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The tendency to view one’s in-group more favorably is referred to as in-group bias. Ingroup bias has implications for group communication and team performance. When favoring
one’s own in-group, it can be assumed that individuals would share more information within the
group to ensure its success. This is especially true when the individuals have a strong identity
connection with the group—they will have a higher self-esteem and a sense of belonging, and
feel superior to those in the out-group.
By definition, individual goals trump group goals in individualistic cultures, whereas,
collectivists, by nature, tend to be more group oriented with their identity centered around “we”.
They make clear distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, whereas individualistic people
do not acknowledge a wide psychological distance between in-groups and out-groups. In fact,
the interdependent identity maintained by the collectivists embraces loyalty to group members,
but discourages being a member of many in-groups. Moreover, “collectivists tend to impose a
large psychological distance between in-group and out-group members, and in-group members
are expected to have unquestioning loyalty to their group” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-7). They even
have more favorable evaluations of those in their in-group. Furthermore, this differentiation
between groups results in the tendency to have “less interaction and communication with the outgroup members, less information sharing, less value placed on their contributions, and fewer
assignments given to those perceived as out-group members” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-7; Salas et al.,
2004). Leveraging from the literature, it is expected that collectivists would engage in more
supporting behavior within teams, considering that their driving goal is to achieve team
objectives, leaving individual motivations aside. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information
sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between

44

supporting behavior and team performance is expected for teams scoring lower on
Individualism than for teams scoring higher on Individualism.

Individualism

Supporting
Behavior

Team
Performance

Figure 2. Hypothesis 2a: Individualism moderating the relation between Supporting Behavior
and Team Performance
Low- versus High-Context Cultures. Hall and Hall (1990) explained the difference
between low- and high-context cultures. According to the authors, there is an overlap with IC, in
that the high- and low-context communication styles are more represented in collectivist and
individualistic cultures, respectively. Riedel (2008) named the United States, Germany, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom as low-context countries. The languages spoken in these countries
abound in proverbs and sayings that confirm the importance of these characteristics—“There is
no learning without questioning” (Israel), “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” (United States),
“He who stirs another’s porridge burns his own” (Germany), “Little is done where many
command” (Netherlands) (Reynolds & Valentine, 2004, p. 5). This preference can be echoed in
Edward Hall’s “low context” communication style, where there is a partiality for unambiguous
and active verbal communication. Buddhist, Hindu, Japanese, African-American, Latino
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cultures are considered high-context. In contrast, collectivism has been associated with intuitive,
indirect, and complex communication, requiring people to “read between the lines”. Proverbs
from collective cultures illustrate these values: “The nail that stands out will get hammered”
(Japan), “The duck that squawks gets shot first” (China), “Behind an able man there are always
other able men”, (Korea), “The sheep that’s separated from the flock is eaten by the wolf”
(Turkey), “There is no wisdom without the group” (Mongolia), “When the spider webs unite,
they can tie up a lion” (Africa) (p.8, Reynolds & Valentine). Similar relations can be found for
high-context communication, in which people rely on implicit communication.
In low-context cultures, there is less appreciation for the non-verbal context of
communication; there is more reliance on explicit and direct communication. People in these
cultures “seek information that emphasized personal or individual aspects rather than social or
group aspects” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-10; Ting-Toomey, 1988). Conversely, high-context cultures
depend more on coded language and non-verbal cues. More importantly for information sharing,
high-context cultures respond favorably to silence. Because individualists are expected to more
vocal about their agreements, as well as disagreements, and uncertainties, it is expected that their
information sharing content would reflect more of a proportion of these exchanges than teams
that are more collectivistic. Therefore, the following hypothesis is presented:
Hypothesis 2b: Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information
sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
information exchange and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on
Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism.
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Individualism

Information
Exchange

Team
Performance

Figure 3. Hypothesis 2b: Individualism moderating the relation between Information Exchange
and Team Performance.

Direct versus Indirect Communication. The research supports that collectivists prefer
indirect communication—“implicit language carefully imbues messages within a more positive
tone to decrease the chances of unpleasant encounters, direct confrontations, and disagreements”
(Riedel, 2008, p. 6-7; Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 1996).
However, they more often speak using words of uncertainty like “maybe”, “perhaps”, and
“somewhat” and avoid negative reactions when communicating to avoid losing face (i.e., selfrespect or pride) and maintain harmony within the group. Because maintaining relationships are
esteemed in collectivist cultures, avoiding confrontation is critical. Further, in Conyne, Wilson,
Tang, and Shi’s (1999) study, they reported that collectivist team members displayed more
hesitancy to speak when sharing information. The authors posited that this was due to an
indecision to speak that was primarily influenced by culture. Not only are collectivists hesitant
to speak, but they are also less likely to ask questions, whereas individualists “value self47

expression, see speaking out as a means of resolving problems, and are likely to use
confrontational strategies when dealing with interpersonal problems” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-8).
Individualists value clarity and directness—a “say what you mean and mean what you say”
communication style. With their focus on understanding the task, rather than building and
maintaining relationships, individualists perceive directness as valuable in information sharing
and accomplishing goals. With individualist team members expected to be less concerned about
losing face and more vocal about how the performance of team members, whether good or poor,
the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2c: Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information
sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between team
reinforcement/punishment and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on
Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism.

Individualism

Team
Reinforcement /
Punishment

Team
Performance

Figure 4. Hypothesis 2c: Individualism moderating the relation between Team Reinforcement /
Punishment and Team Performance
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Power Distance: Examining Social Inequalities
Hofstede defined Power Distance as “the extent to which the less powerful members of
institutions and organizations with a country expect and accept that power is distributed
unequally. ‘Institutions’ are the basic elements of society like the family, school, and the
community; ‘organizations’ are the places where people work” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 28). This
construct is conceptualized from the perspective of the less powerful members, suggesting that
the degree of inequality within the society is endorsed by the subordinates as well as the leaders.
The power distance index measures the dependence relationships in a particular country; ranging
from lower Power Distance countries (e.g., United States, Great Britain) where one could expect
that subordinates would approach and / or contradict their bosses without anxiety to higher
Power Distance countries (e.g., Latin European and Latin American countries, Asian, and
African countries) where one would expect that subordinates understand their lower position on
the ladder, making it unlikely for them to approach their superiors directly (Hofstede, 1991).
With regard to information sharing, low Power Distance individuals use less formal
modes of communication; they challenge ideas in unconventional ways to find innovative
answers to problems. They do not find it offensive to question power holders, emphasize their
personal rights, and defend their beliefs so that their point is heard. Thus, the hierarchical
protocol established within the organization does not thwart them from asserting vital
information to improve performance.
These information sharing trends are not reflected in high Power Distance teams. For
example, Smith and his colleagues have reported that managers working in high PowerDistanced societies report using more formal rules in their daily operations (Smith, Peterson &
Misumi, 1994; Smith, Peterson & Schwartz, 2002). Within these societies, subordinates are also
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fearful of questioning or disputing their managers (Adsit, London, Crom, & Jones, 1997), relying
more on following orders. More importantly, subordinates may fail to provide critical
information to leaders, believing it is the leader’s responsibility to make decisions (Helmreich,
2000; Riedel, 2008). Or they may fail to challenge a commander’s decision, even if it could
result in catastrophic consequences. Due to the differences in superior-subordinate interactions
that Power Distance can present, this cultural dimension can be problematic for team outcomes,
but the results are empirically clear. The theoretical propositions would suggest that as the
distance in power widens, there would be increases in formal protocol and more emphasis on
providing direction to team members to ensure superior task performance than for teams that
perceive the power distance to be more shared (or shortened). Therefore, the following
hypothesis is presented:
Hypothesis 3: Power Distance is expected to moderate the relation between information
sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
directing tasks and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on Power
Distance than for teams scoring lower on Power Distance.

Power Distance

Team
Performance

Directing Tasks

Figure 5. Hypothesis 3: Power distance moderating the relation between directing tasks and team
performance
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Uncertainty Avoidance: Adapt or Not to Adapt?
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which “a society feels threatened by
uncertain and ambiguous situations and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater career
stability, establishing more formal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviors, and
believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expertise” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45).
Unstructured situations are more accepted in societies that are characterized by low uncertainty
avoidance, like Canada, United Kingdom, Denmark, India, France, Hong Kong, Sweden, and the
United States (Riedel, 2008). People from low uncertainty avoidance cultures tolerate
disagreement and healthy conflict. Individuals are able to adapt easily, are able and willing to
manage change without much stress. Moreover, rules and protocol are not formalized and
inflexible as in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. Individuals cope with the ever-changing and
unpredictable environment by enforcing few rules and accepting of other people’s opinions.
Further, dissent and conflict are seen as natural and effective making the ability to cope and
change with the uncertainty easier in these societies. “Low uncertainty avoidance cultures are
characterized by low stress, acceptance of dissent, high level of risk-taking, and few rituals”
(Riedel, 2008, p. 6-9). Risk-taking and few rituals also characterize this culture, which can
breed more flexibility, unique perspectives, and higher gains of performance. However, team
leaders who are low on uncertainty avoidance may not provide enough structure and details
regarding the mission—perhaps withholding pertinent information needed for the team to do the
tasks.
In contrast, societies that are high on uncertainty avoidance employ strict rules and norm
expectations that are weaved into a belief of absolute Truth to reduce the probability of engaging
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in novel situations. Countries that are said to be high on uncertainty avoidance include
Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Japan, and Mexico (Riedel, 2008).
In a study by Rifkind and Harper (1993), they found that employees in high Uncertainty
Avoidance cultures preferred transparent instruction, specialized jobs and cooperation with
others. Team members who are high on Uncertainty Avoidance tend to ask for excessive amount
of guidance and information, stifling creativity and innovative input for the task (Riedel, 2008).
Team leaders may attempt to control the situation so much to avoid uncertainty that the dialogue
is not sufficient to develop situational awareness. In this case, the team leader might be better
off completing the task him/herself.
Teams comprised of Uncertainty-Avoidant members aim at reducing uncertainty by
developing a strategy, although the plan can provide problems later if it needs modification.
Another unsettling characteristic is the tendency to ignore information that does not correspond
to initial thought and feel threatened when the plan has to change (Ilgen, LePine, & Hollenbeck,
1997). Further, high Uncertainty-Avoidant members may prevent the team from adapting
because they are limiting access to dissenting cues and stifling innovative solutions. Interactions
that are considered critical for team performance—consensus building, and considering all data,
even dissenting information—were negatively related to high need for structure—a construct that
is greatly correlated with high Uncertainty Avoidance. Another team performance hindrance
presented by high Uncertainty Avoidance is the reluctance to engage in risk-taking. However, in
the military, many of the missions are characterized by a consistent uncertain environment. It
could be suggested that when working in these military teams, it is beneficial to have some
individuals who are low on Uncertainty Avoidance as to prevent mission jeopardy. To
summarize, team members who score higher on Uncertainty Avoidance tend to engage in more
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planning to reduce the feeling of ambiguity, avoid dissenting information, and are reluctant to
take risks. Because developing a solid strategy is key to Uncertainty Avoidant cultures, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4a: Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between
information sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation
between planning and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on
Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams scoring lower on Uncertainty Avoidance.

Uncertainty
Avoidance

Team
Performance

Planning

Figure 6. Hypothesis 4a: Uncertainty Avoidance moderating the relation between planning and
team performance

Additionally, recent research attention has turned to themes of uncertainty reduction and
on a construct named Personal Need for Structure, which refers to a cognitive preference for
structure and clarity (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001; Neuberg, Judice, &
West, 1997; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). For example, individuals who have high scores on
Personal Need for Structure “prefer simplicity, precision, and structure in most situations, with
ambiguity and grey areas proving troubling and uncomfortable” (Thompson, 2008, p. KN2-4).
They tend to have more confidence in their group evaluations, tend to avoid procrastination, and
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push for creating fast solutions. Because their focus is on the task work, rather than teamwork,
they are assertive about gaining group consensus early even if that requires rejecting dissenting
information (i.e., groupthink becomes a concern). Thus, they snub consensus building, team
empowerment to voice opinions, and buy-in from the group—all requisites for team decisionmaking effectiveness. This style has been noted as “detrimental to the success of multinational
coalitions” (Thompson, 2008, p. KN2-5). The tendency to develop a strategy early and remain
on task requires those proponents to continue to search and report data to their team that are
aligned with supporting their strategy. This process allows for quietly dissenting team members
to commit to the plan, increase team buy-in, and promote team unity. In doing so, it is expected
that those who possess a Personal Need for Structure and are Uncertainty Avoidant will provide
many situation updates to ensure that the tasks are on time and the feedback on performance was
acceptable. Thus, the following hypothesis is provided:
Hypothesis 4b: Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between
information sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation
between situation update and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on
Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams scoring lower on Uncertainty Avoidance.

Uncertainty
Avoidance

Team
Performance

Situation Update

Figure 7. Hypothesis 4b: Uncertainty Avoidance moderating the relation between situation
update and team performance.

54

Current Study
The current study was conducted to understand the relations among culture, information
sharing, and team performance. To do so, I analyzed archival data originally collected under the
NATO Human Factors & Medicine Panel-138, in the investigators conducted an experiment
among a participant sample of NATO Officers from five countries (Bulgaria, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and United States). The experimental task involved having the participants
complete individual difference and attitude questionnaires and participate in a computer-based
task in teams of four. The task was developed to be a true team experiment in that all of the team
members did not hold the identical information. In order to complete the mission of finding
weapons caches, the team members had to virtually share information (e.g., typing and sharing
information to the entire team). All of the information was automatically collected throughout
the experiment. The participants’ ability to find the weapons caches and interact with the virtual
characters in a culturally-appropriate manner affected the team performance score. The criterion
(team performance) was automatically calculated throughout the experiment, with increases and
decreases of the score reported to the team. After the experiment, the participants completed
other measures regarding the team dynamics and perceived team performance. The data
collected from this experiment were analyzed to advance the industrial and organizational
psychology research domain by examining teams from a non-Western lens. A summary of the
hypotheses can be found in Table 5 and depicted in Figure 8 below. The Method section
provides details about the information sharing coding system that was developed to test the
aforementioned hypotheses.

55

Table 5. Summary of Hypotheses
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2a

Hypothesis 2b

Hypothesis 2c

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4a

Hypothesis 4b

The information sharing is expected to positively predict team performance.
Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information sharing
content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
supporting behavior and team performance is expected for teams scoring lower
on Individualism than for teams scoring higher on Individualism.
Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information sharing
content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
information exchange and team performance is expected for teams scoring
higher on Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism.
Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information sharing
content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between team
reinforcement/punishment and team performance is expected for teams scoring
higher on Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism.
Power Distance is expected to moderate the relation between information
sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation
between directing tasks and team performance is expected for teams scoring
higher on Power Distance than for teams scoring lower on Power Distance.
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between
information sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher
correlation between planning and team performance is expected for teams
scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams scoring lower on
Uncertainty Avoidance.
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between
information sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher
correlation between situation update and team performance is expected for
teams scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams scoring lower on
Uncertainty Avoidance.
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Figure 8. Model of Hypotheses
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD
Participants
The study participants included a sample of 48 four-person teams (yielding a total of 192
individuals), representing five countries: Bulgaria (n = 8), the Netherlands (n = 8), Norway (n =
16), Sweden (n = 9), and United States (n = 7). The participant characteristics required for
inclusion were that they were male officers with a rank of OF-1 to OF-4, between the ages of 1835. Within teams, the members were of the same rank. Other requirements were normal, or
corrected-to-normal vision, and familiarity with computer use (e.g., mouse, keyboard). They had
to ethnically and culturally identify with the nation under study and reported to not have spent
more than 6 months between the ages of one and 18 living outside of the nation under study.
Further, they had to have completed or were currently enrolled in college. Finally, the study was
limited to those who were fluent in written English.
Measures
Background Information. The participants completed a Background Information
questionnaire that had 19 items eliciting demographic information (e.g., age, sex, nationality,
languages, education, rank, computer and game experience; see Appendix B).
Culture Values. The Hofstede Value Survey Module 1994 (VSM 94) Culture Survey was
administered to assess the five cultural values (Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty
Avoidance, Long-Term Orientation, and Masculinity) for each participant. The VSM 94
includes 20 items (four for each subscale). All of the items are scored on a five-point scale, but
varied on response formats. The items asked for ratings of either (a) importance (“Of Utmost
Importance” to “Of Very Little Importance”), (b) agreement (“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly
Agree”), or (c) frequency. An example item is “Competition between employees usually does
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more harm than good.” Although the VSM 94 is widely used, there is limited information about
the psychometric properties of this measure by the author. Further, no information about the
reliability and construct validity of the five dimension was provided in Hofstede’s (1994) manual
(Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001). Relying on the psychometric properties provided by
Spector, Cooper, & Spark’s (2001) critique, the following are the reported internal consistencies
for the subscales: Individualism (alpha = 0.57), Power Distance (alpha = 0.64), Uncertainty
Avoidance (alpha = 0.49), Long-Term Orientation (alpha = 0.74), and Masculinity (alpha =
0.29). Although the cultural values were collected from each of the participant, the values
reported in the database were not used for this study for two reasons. Hofstede (2001) reiterates
that the cultural values are to be collected and reported to reflect a national-level index. The
sample size for these analyses was only 48, with homogeneous teams representing between 7 and
16 teams. This amount of data is limited to reflect a national-level cultural value. Second, and
most important, the values reported in the database were not to scale for interpretation as they
should be in accordance to Hofstede’s guidance. Moreover, many of the values exceeded 100,
with Hofstede’s values ranging from 0-100. Thus, to respond to this discrepancy and to address a
national level, I consulted the national cultural values reported on Hofstede’s website. The
values for Power Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance were provided for all five
countries (see Table 6). Thus, these were the values used in the analyses for this study.
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Table 6. Hofstede Cultural Value Scores
Country
Power Distance

Individualism

Bulgaria
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
USA

30
80
69
71
91

70
38
31
31
40

Uncertainty
Avoidance
85
53
50
29
46

Information Sharing Coding. Typed messages by all team members during the team task
were automatically collected by the computer program. There were three steps involved in
developing the information sharing coding system: (a) reviewing coding systems in the literature
and developing a preliminary coding system; (b) testing theoretical model with a card sort
technique with a doctoral student team; and (c) review, revise, tryout, and finalize the coding
system with the research assistant coding team. STEP 1: To develop the coding system, I
reviewed existing coding systems in the literature to examine their capability to code this study’s
data (e.g., Rosen, 2010; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich, & Reynolds, 2001). Rosen (2010)
presented six communication coding processes, each with at least one sub-dimension: Team
Information Exchange (Information Provision, Information Request), Team Knowledge Sharing
(Knowledge Provision, Knowledge Request), Team Solution Option Generation (Option
Generation-Part, Option Generation-Full), Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives
(Solution Evaluation), Team Process and Plan Regulation (Goal/Task Orientation, Situation
Update/Request, Reflection), and Other (Simple Agree/Disagree/Acknowledgements,
Fillers/Incomplete/Exclamation, Tangent/Off-Task, Uncertainty). Because of the difference in
nature of the current study and that of Rosen (e.g., coders in Rosen’s study were aware of what
was presented on the computer screen), I consulted another study that employed a categorical
system from Team Dimensional Training (TDT). Smith-Jentsch et al. (2001) presented four
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dimensions and 11 subcategories as an expert mental model of teamwork: Information Exchange
(Utilizing information from all available resources, Passing information before being asked,
Providing situation updates), Communication (Using proper phraseology, Providing complete
reports, Using clear communication, Using brief communication), Supporting Behavior
(Correcting errors, Requesting and providing backup), Initiative/Leadership (Providing guidance,
Stating clear priorities). STEP 2: After examining the coding system dimensions and definitions,
I developed the first version. Two coding teams were recruited to finalize the information
sharing coding system. The first team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) consisted of five I/O
psychology doctoral students. The SMEs were presented with individual information sharing
messages that were collected from the heterogeneous teams that participated in the original
NATO HFM study. They were blind to the study participant who typed the message, to whom
the message was sent, and what country he represented. The students each read the individual
message and conducted a card sort, as documented in the development procedure for the TDT
mental model. After the completion of the individual card sort, the students discussed the
number, messages, and labels of their groups. The students then finalized their coding system by
consensus using the actual information sharing data. I compared the coding system that was
derived theoretically from the literature to that of what the doctoral student team developed and
made some revisions.
STEP 3: A second team of four graduate I/O psychology students (one doctoral and three
Master’s students) and one post-baccalaureate student served as coders for this study. The team
of five reviewed the experimenter’s guide to familiarize themselves with the study. The team
was provided with an introduction to the current study and the coding system. To train the team
on the coding system, the team met in a classroom and each dimension, sub-category, and
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respective definitions were reviewed. In the same session, they were provided with examples of
information sharing messages collected from the heterogeneous teams and discussed the most
appropriate coding system dimension. Any discrepancies were discussed and rationales were
provided for the coding. After the initial training session, the team coded data (550 statements)
from the mixed-culture teams for the following week for practice and to examine their coding
agreement. The mixed-culture data were chosen for training as they were not to be included in
the analyses for this study, but allow for a realistic preview of the data from the culturallyhomogeneous teams. We met again and discussed all codes to facilitate a shared mental model.
Definitions for some of the dimensions were discussed and further refined. This training process
continued weekly as all eight heterogeneous teams were analyzed. After the training period, the
final coding system consisted of seven categories (Appendix A): Task Direction (Task Action),
Situation Update (Teammate’s Current Action, Update on the Simulation/Task, Progress),
Planning (Roles/Responsibilities, Goal Setting, Strategy, Task Option Generation), Supporting
Behavior (Backup Behavior), Information Exchange (Agreement, Disagreement,
Uncertainty/Indifference, Greetings), Team Reinforcement/Punishment (Exclamation, Positive
Reinforcement/Positive Emoticon, Negative Comments/Negative Emoticon), Other
(Incomplete/Filler/Miscellaneous).
After training, the coders were provided with the data in separate Excel files for each
team. As in the training, they were blind to the study participant who typed the message, to
whom the message was sent, and what country he represented. They were instructed to read the
message and type the number of the information sharing sub-category code in the column
adjacent to the message. Every week, the coders completed the coding for numerous teams
(ranging from four to twelve teams), with the number of teams dependent on the amount of
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messages communicated among the study participants. There were three coders for the coding
content analyses. I analyzed agreement by calculating the percentage of statements of when the
three coders selected the same coding content area for each statement in relation to the total
statements for each team. More specifically, if two coders agreed on the content area for a
statement, but one disagreed, that statement was coded as a disagreement. If all three selected
different content areas, that statement was coded as a disagreement. Only when all three coders
selected the same content area for the statement was when the statement was analyzed as
agreement. To complete the agreement analyses, I coded all agreements as "1" and
disagreements as "0", then calculated the percentage by dividing the total agreements over total
statements for that team, which yielded an agreement ratio. I color coded discrepancies and
reported the results to the research assistant team. This procedure continued until all of the
initial coding was completed (approximately eight weeks). I examined the coding agreement
percentage for all of the data for this study. The mean agreement percentage was 60%, which
indicated that 40% of the statements coded had at least one coder to disagree on the content area.
To resolve these coding discrepancies, the coding team met in person, engaged in discussion, and
came to consensus for all of the coding disagreements.
Team Performance. Team Performance was automatically collected by the computer
program. Performance for each team was generated by a metric regarded as a “Goodwill Score”,
with the result dependent on their interactions with avatars in order to complete the mission. The
mission is to search for hidden weapons caches inside and outside of buildings. Each team is
instructed to maximize their Goodwill Score by interacting with virtual characters within the
town and find the caches. The score is only provided for the entire team (there is no individual
performance score) and all members are provided with real-time feedback on each time a
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member gains or loses points for the team. The Goodwill Score is calculated based on their
ability to find these caches. The maximum number of weapons that each team can find in the
town is 20: four outdoors, 12 indoors, and four indoors that exist for a short period of time.
Considering that each indoor cache is worth 300 Goodwill points and each outdoor cache is
worth 100 points, the maximum points that each team can gain based on the search are 5200.
The teams can also earn up to 530 additional points by accomplishing other tasks unrelated to the
mission (e.g., recover a stolen necklace, find a missing child, assist police with criminals). Thus,
the team can gain a maximum of 5730; however, attaining this score is unlikely. Because there
are approximately 40 houses, 10 empty crates, and two trapped crates, the team could
theoretically lose up to 3500 Goodwill points. Losing the maximum points is also unlikely.
Although finding the weapons caches is a primary indicator of the team performance, the
members have to also avoid penalties to maximize their Goodwill score.

Procedure
Principal investigators volunteered to supervise the data collection from the participating
countries. NATO Officers were randomly assigned to team roles (e.g., “Nathaniel”, “Frank”,
“Jacob”, and “William”). To familiarize themselves with their role and task assignments, the
experimenter led a training session before the experiment commenced. The experiment was
based on the Situation Authorable Behavior Research Environment game-based testbed that used
the “Neverwinter Nights™” computer program. The main objective of the mission was to
collaborate team efforts to find simulated weapons caches while maintaining positive
relationships with the local populace. As previously mentioned, communication was
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automatically recorded for all participant during the task. The Goodwill Score was automatically
generated after the experiment was completed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
To analyze the hypotheses in this study, I used Multiple Regression Analysis using
IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 16.0. Details are provided
below for each hypothesis, beginning with descriptive data.
Descriptive Data
Table 7 provides the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the
variables of interest. As shown, the coded information sharing content areas were all
significantly correlated with each other, except for Supporting Behavior. The total amount of
information sharing was positively correlated with team performance (r = .33, p < .05). The
information sharing dimension that was significantly related to overall team performance was
Situation Update (r = .42, p < .01). Situation Update was the information sharing content that
was most strongly correlated with total information sharing (r = .93, p < .01), with all of the
other content areas having similarly high correlations with total information sharing except for
Support Behavior. That is, as the Situation Updates increased during the team task, the total
information sharing also increased. Moreover, the more that teams engaged in Task Direction,
Planning, Supporting Behavior, Information Exchange, and Reinforcement / Punishment, the
more information sharing was observed. However, Supporting Behavior was not related to total
information sharing.
The cultural dimensions correlated with many information sharing content areas.
Specifically, Power Distance was negatively related to Task Direction (r =-0.53, p < .01),
Situation Update (r = -0.53, p < .01), Planning (r = -0.41, p < .01), Information Exchange (r = 0.51, p < .01), Team Reinforcement /Punishment (r = -0.39, p < .01), and Total IS (r = -0.57, p <
.01). Likewise, but with positive correlations, Individualism was significantly related to Task
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Direction (r =0.51, p < .01), Situation Update (r = 0.75, p < .01), Planning (r = 0.65, p < .01),
Information Exchange (r = 0.49, p < .01), Team Reinforcement /Punishment (r = 0.63, p < .01),
and Total IS (r = 0.71, p < .01). Finally, Uncertainty Avoidance was negatively related to Task
Direction (r =-0.51, p < .01), Situation Update (r = -0.54, p < .01), Planning (r = -0.41, p < .01),
Information Exchange (r = -0.50, p < .01), Team Reinforcement /Punishment (r = -0.39, p < .01),
and Total IS (r = -0.55, p < .01).
Not surprisingly, there were high correlations among the culture variables with Power
Distance being negatively related to Individualism (r = -0.79, p < .01) and positively to
Uncertainty Avoidance (r = -0.89, p < .01), and Individualism negatively related to Uncertainty
Avoidance (r = -0.77, p < .01). These very high correlations among the culture dimensions
suggest substantial overlap between the three cultural dimensions and can explain why they
correlate similarly with the information sharing content areas. The most common information
sharing content used by all teams was Situation Update (32.77% of all IS) followed by Task
Direction (25.19%), Planning (19.12%), Information Exchange (14.90%), and Supporting
Behavior (0.52%). The infrequent use of Supporting Behavior explains the lack of relations with
any of the variables of interest.
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Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations
Variable

M (SD)

92.44
(52.72)
120.52
2. Situation Update
(59.93)
69.42
3. Planning
(32.45)
1.92
4. Supporting Behavior
(2.02)
54.67
5. Information Exchange
(34.22)
6. Team Reinforcement / 5.23
Punishment
(4.31)
7. Other
22.17
Communications
(18.23)
8. Total
366.35
Communications
(172.40)
803.96
9. Team Performance
(437.13)
39.98
10. Power Distance
(14.03)
67.92
11. Individualism
(18.74)
12. Uncertainty
51.81
Avoidance
(17.13)
1. Task Direction

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.76**

-

.46**

.63**

-

.04

.18

-.01

-

.73**

.72**

.59**

-.02

-

.58**

.72**

.65**

.17

.49**

-

.63**

.65**

.53**

.05

.57**

.57**

-

.88**

.93**

.74**

.09

.86**

.73**

.75**

-

.16

.42**

.25

.08

.26

.26

.25

.33*

-

-.53** -.53**

-.41**

-.17

-.51**

-.39**

-.31*

-.57**

.07

-

.51**

.75**

.65**

.19

.49**

.63**

.47**

.71**

.26

-.79**

-

-.51** -.54**

-.41**

-.19

-.50**

-.39**

-.21

-.55**

-.04

.89**

-.77**

Note. N = 48.
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01
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Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis 1 proposed that there would be a relation between information sharing and
team performance. To test this hypothesis, I correlated the total information sharing statements
with the team performance score. The information sharing-team performance correlation was
statistically significant (r = .33, p = .02), suggesting that greater information sharing positively
related to the teams’ performance on this task.
Hypothesis 2a-c proposed that Individualism would moderate the relation between
information sharing content and team performance. To analyze these hypotheses, I employed
steps cited in Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004). I first centered the information sharing content
variables (Supporting Behavior for Hypothesis 2a, Information Exchange for Hypothesis 2b, and
Reinforcement / Punishment for Hypothesis 2c) and Individualism (moderator variable). I then
created product terms to represent the interaction between the information sharing content
variables and Individualism by multiplying them together. Finally, I structured three separate
hierarchical multiple regression equations to test for moderating effects.
For Hypothesis 2a, which tested the moderating effect of Individualism on the Supporting
Behavior-team performance relation, team performance was regressed onto Individualism,
Supporting Behavior, and the interaction between Individualism and Supporting Behavior. The
reduced model was not statistically significant, but the full model was significant, with a
significant main effect of Individualism (β = .34) and a significant interaction term (F (3, 44) =
3.27, p = .03; β = .35, p = .02), suggesting that Individualism significantly moderated the
relation between Supporting Behavior and Team Performance. Specifically, for those teams that
scored low on Individualism, Supporting Behavior had a negative association to team
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performance. Conversely, for the teams that scored high on Individualism, Supporting Behavior
had a positive relation with team performance. Interestingly, although the interaction was
significant, it was in the opposite direction than proposed. Additionally, the model accounted for
13% of the variance in team performance, with the interaction term accounting for an additional
10% of the variance over the main effects.
For additional information, Table 8 provides the statistical analysis results and Figure 9
provides the graphical representation of the interaction.
Table 8. Testing the Moderating Effect of Individualism on Supporting Behavior and Team
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Model 1
Variable

B

Model 2
β

SE

B

SE

β

Supporting Behavior

7.59

31.70

.04

-5.21

30.51

-.02

Individualism

5.97

3.42

.26

7.86

3.33

.34*

4.04

1.64

.35*

Supporting Behavior x
Individualism
F
Adjusted R

2

1.70

3.27*

.03

.13

Note. N = 48
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Supporting Behavior x Individualism
1200

Team Performance

1000
800

Individualism
High

600

Medium

400

Low
200
0
Low

Medium

High

Supporting Behavior

Figure 9. Supporting Behavior x Individualism Interaction
To test Hypothesis 2b, team performance was regressed onto Individualism, Information
Exchange, and the interaction between Individualism and Information Exchange. The reduced
model was not statistically significant, but the full model was significant, with a significant main
effect of Individualism (β = .76) and a significant interaction term (F (3, 44) = 4.68, p = .01, β =
.65, p = .01). These results suggest that Information Exchange had a positive relation with team
performance for the high-scoring Individualist teams. However, the relation was negative for
teams that were lower on Individualism. The model accounted for 19% of the variance in team
performance. Table 9 and Figure 10 provide additional information to further illustrate said
moderated relation.
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Table 9. Testing the Moderating Effect of Individualism on Information Exchange and Team
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Model 1
Variable

B

Model 2
β

SE

B

β

SE

Information Exchange

2.21

2.09

.17

.20

2.04

.02

Individualism

4.13

3.81

.18

17.74

5.80

.76**

.44

.15

.65**

Information Exchange x
Individualism
F

2.26

4.68**

Adjusted R2

.05

.19

Note. N = 48
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Information Exchange x Individualism
Team Performance

1200
1000

Individualism
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400
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200
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Information Exchange

Figure 10. Information Exchange x Individualism Interaction
For Hypothesis 2c, team performance was regressed on Individualism, Reinforcement /
Punishment, and the interaction between Individualism and Reinforcement / Punishment. The
reduced model was not significant; however, the full model was statistically significant, with a
significant main effect for Individualism (β = .56), and a significant Individualism x
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Reinforcement / Punishment interaction (F (3, 44) = 3.24, p = 03; β = .44, p = .03). Specifically,
the relation between Reinforcement / Punishment and team performance was positive for those
teams high on Individualism and negative for those teams who were low on the cultural value.
That is, for more Individualist teams, statements regarding Reinforcement and Punishment were
stronger positive predictors of team performance. In contrast, these statements were indicative
of poorer performance scores for teams that did not score high on Individualism. For further
clarification, the analysis results and graphical representation of this interaction can be found on
Table 10 and Figure 11, respectively. In summary, the findings from the data analyses regarding
Individualism as a moderator for information sharing and team performance were statistically
significant; thus, Hypotheses 2b and 2c were supported, and there were effects for 2a, but not in
the direction proposed.

Table 10. Testing the Moderating Effect of Individualism on Reinforcement / Punishment and
Team Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Model 1

Model 2

B

SE

β

B

SE

β

Reinforcement /
Punishment

15.09

18.61

.15

-12.21

21.36

-.12

Individualism

3.94

4.28

.17

12.95

5.66

.56*

2.28

.99

.44*

Variable

Reinforcement /
Punishment x
Individualism
F
Adjusted R

2

2.02

3.24*

.04

.13

Note. N = 48
*p < .05. **p < .01.

73
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Figure 11. Reinforcement / Punishment x Individualism Interaction

To test Hypothesis 3, team performance was regressed onto Power Distance, Task
Direction, and the interaction between Power Distance and Task Direction. The reduced model
was not statistically significant; however, the full model was significant, with significant main
effects for Task Direction (β = .43), Power Distance (β = .85) and a significant interaction term
(F (3, 44) = 2.86, p = 05; β = .65, p = .02). The model accounted for 11% of the variance in team
performance. The finding suggests that those teams that scored higher on Power Distance
performed better on the task than those teams that scored lower. Further, the results show that
the relation between Task Direction and team performance was positive for High-Power
Distance teams and negative for Low-Power Distance teams; therefore, this analysis provides
support for Hypothesis 3. The results for this analysis can be found in Table 11 and the plotted
graph on Figure 12.
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Table 11. Testing the Moderating Effect of Power Distance on Task Direction and Team
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Model 1

Model 2

B

SE

β

B

SE

β

Task Direction

2.31

1.41

.28

3.55

1.45

.43*

Power Distance

6.78

5.30

.22

26.52

9.89

.85**

.36

.16

.65*

Variable

Task Direction x Power
Distance
F
Adjusted R

2

1.46

2.86*

.02

.11

Note. N = 48
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Figure 12. Task Direction x Power Distance Interaction

Hypotheses 4a and 4b proposed that Uncertainty Avoidance was expected to moderate
the relation between information sharing content (Planning for 4a and Situation Update for 4b)
and Team Performance. To test Hypothesis 4a, team performance was regressed onto
Uncertainty Avoidance, Planning, and the interaction between Uncertainty Avoidance and
Planning. Neither the reduced model (F (2, 45) = 1.54, p = .23) nor the full model were
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statistically significant (F (3, 44) = 1.34, p = .26), providing no support for Hypothesis 4a (see
Table 12 for details).
Table 12. Testing the Moderating Effect of Uncertainty Avoidance on Planning and Team
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Variable
Planning

B
3.69

Model 1
SE
2.13

Uncertainty Avoidance

1.79

4.04

Planning x Uncertainty
Avoidance
F
Adjusted R2
Note. N = 48
*p < .05. **p < .01.

β
0.27
0.07

B
3.94

Model 2
SE
2.15

β
.29

-2.23

5.62

-.09

-.18

.17

-.22

1.54
.02

1.38
.02

To test Hypothesis 4b, team performance was regressed onto Uncertainty Avoidance,
Situation Update, and the interaction between Uncertainty Avoidance and Situation Update.
Both the reduced model (F (2, 45) = 6.43, p = .00) and the full model were statistically
significant (F (3, 44) = 4.35, p = .01). Although the main effect for Situation Update was
significant in the full model (β = .57), the Situation Update-Uncertainty Avoidance interaction
was not statistically significant. Moreover, Uncertainty Avoidance did not present any change in
strength in the relations between information sharing content and team performance. Thus, there
was no statistical support for Hypothesis 4b (see Table 13).
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Table 13. Testing the Moderating Effect of Uncertainty Avoidance on Situation Update and
Team Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression
Variable
Situation Update

B
4.05

Model 1
SE
1.13

Uncertainty Avoidance

6.48

3.97

Situation Update x
Uncertainty Avoidance
F
Adjusted R2
Note. N = 48
*p < .05. **p < .01.

β
.56**
.25

6.43**
.19

B
4.16

Model 2
SE
1.16

β
.57**

4.10

5.59

.16

-.05

.08

-.13
4.35**
.18

In summary, most of information sharing dimensions was strongly correlated.
Information sharing was also related to both team performance and culture. Although there was
high multicollinearity among the information sharing dimensions and cultural values, only
Individualism and Power Distance were significant moderators for various Information Sharing
content areas. Unfortunately, Uncertainty Avoidance was not observed to be an influential factor
for the Planning- and Situation Update-Team Performance relations. A summary of the
hypothesis tests can be found in Table 14.
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Table 14. Hypothesis Test Results
Hypothesis

Proposed Relation

Result

Hypothesis 1

The information sharing was expected to be positively
correlated with team performance.

Supported

Hypothesis 2a

Individualism was expected to moderate the relation
between information sharing content and team
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
supporting behavior and team performance was expected
for teams that scored low on Individualism than for teams
scoring high on Individualism.
Individualism was expected to moderate the relation
between information sharing content and team
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
information exchange and team performance was
expected for teams that scored high on Individualism than
for teams that scored low on Individualism.
Individualism was expected to moderate the relation
between information sharing content and team
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
team reinforcement/punishment and team performance is
expected for teams scoring higher on Individualism than
for teams scoring lower on Individualism.
Power Distance is expected to moderate the relation
between information sharing content and team
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
directing tasks and team performance is expected for
teams scoring higher on Power Distance than for teams
scoring lower on Power Distance.
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the
relation between information sharing content and team
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
planning and team performance is expected for teams
scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams
scoring lower on Uncertainty Avoidance.
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the
relation between information sharing content and team
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between
situation update and team performance is expected for
teams scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for
teams scoring lower on Uncertainty Avoidance.

Not Supported
(interactive effects
found in opposite
direction)

Hypothesis 2b

Hypothesis 2c

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4a

Hypothesis 4b
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Supported

Supported

Supported

Not Supported

Not Supported

Exploratory Analyses
To fully understand how culture related to information sharing and team performance in
this study, I will provide an abridged overview of the culture scores and communication-pattern
differences within each country.
Culture
The cultural variables of interest in this study were Individualism, Power Distance, and
Uncertainty Avoidance. As reported earlier in this paper, the three culture variables were highly
correlated, suggesting that the measures do not represent separate constructs. Thus, I will report
information sharing differences based on Individualism only.
Information Sharing
Seven information sharing dimensions were coded in this study: Task Direction, Situation
Update, Planning, Supporting Behavior, Information Exchange, Team
Reinforcement/Punishment, and Other Communications. With the exception of Supporting
Behavior, these information sharing dimensions were strongly correlated (p < .05). Although the
total amount of communication was significantly related to team performance (r = 0.33, p <
0.05), the only coded dimension that was related to team performance was Situation Update (r =
0.42, p < 0.01). In addition to correlations, I also examined the total number of information
sharing statements by country and culture.
To examine total information sharing, I calculated team-level minimum, maximum, and
average scores of total IS by Nationality (and rank for Norway). The results can be found in
Table 18. The teams from the USA had the highest Individualism score and the highest
maximum IS messages of all of the teams (698 statements). However, the Netherlands NATO
teams, with the second highest Individualism score, had the highest mean IS score (511.75
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statements). Bulgaria, the least individualistic country in the study, had the lowest team
minimum frequency (29 statements), lowest maximum team score (168 statements) and lowest
mean (114.38 statements). When examining mean differences in total IS, I conducted a OneWay Analysis of Variance and found that there were significant information sharing differences
among countries (F (4, 43) = 12.73, p < .00). The eta-squared (ŋ2) was calculated by dividing the
Sum of Squares Between Groups by the Sum of Squares Total to yield the effect size of this
analysis. The ŋ2 was .28, suggesting that 28% of the variance in team performance was
accounted for by nationality.
Table 15. Cultural Values, Information Sharing, and Performance Data by Country
PD

IND

UA

Team
Performance
Min

Team
Performance
Max

Team
Performance
Mean

Norway

8 31

69

50 153 362

258.5

150

800

406.25

Norway

8 31

69

50 322 666

454.5

0

1150

733.75

Sweden

9 31

71

29 262 658 402.67

150

1950

760

USA

7 40

91

46 286 698

900

1690

1235.71

Netherlands 8 38

80

53 361 653 511.75

500

1250

1001.25

Bulgaria

30

85

250

1650

746.25

Country

N

8 70

IS
Min

29

IS
Max

IS
Mean

464

168 114.38

With an Individualism score that was the second lowest in the study sample, Norway was
the only country that had teams with different ranks. Though not a focus in this study, there
were distinct information sharing differences when examining the junior- versus senior-Officer
teams. Specifically, the junior teams had a higher minimum, maximum, and mean information
sharing frequency as compared to their senior counterparts. These findings can be found in
Table 16. To further understand if there were statistical Information Sharing differences between
ranks, an Analysis of Variance was conducted. The result was that there was a statistical
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significant difference in total IS between senior and junior Norwegian Officers (F (1, 14) =
13.70, p < .01).
Table 16. Rank Differences in Total Statements for Norwegian Officers
Variable
N
Mean
SD
Minimum
Senior Norwegian
Officer Teams
Junior Norwegian
Officer Teams

Maximum

8

258.50

75.36

153

362

8

454.50

129.43

322

666

When separating the experimental task into three equal temporal phases—beginning,
middle, and end, there are some unique communication differences exhibited by culture. To
examine these information sharing differences, I visually examined a data set from each country
that reflected the closest total information sharing frequency as the country’s mean index (among
all teams within each country), as detailed in Table 17. These data were intended to provide an
overview of information sharing differences by nationality. Interestingly, when taking a sample
of information sharing data from each country, those that are more individualistic (Sweden,
USA, and the Netherlands), as determined by a median split, exhibited the same pattern of
communication when examining the most coded information sharing content area in the three
aforementioned phases. That is, when examining the frequency of information sharing content
by time phase, the highest percentage of communication was Planning for the beginning phase,
and Situation Update for the middle and end phases for the more Individualistic teams. Bulgaria,
the most collectivist country, most frequently engaged in Planning for all three phases. The
other collectivist country, although not as collectivist as Bulgaria, is Norway. As found in total
IS, the Norwegian teams differed by rank level, but not as expected. The senior-ranked
Norwegian Officers relied on Planning for the beginning phase, Situation Update for the middle,
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and Task Direction for the end phase. However, the information sharing patterns by the junior
Norwegian Officers mirrored those from the senior officers from individualist cultures—
Planning for the beginning, and Situation Update for the middle and end phases.
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Table 17. Information Sharing Differences by Temporal Phase
Country

Norway

Norway
(Junior)

Sweden

USA

Netherlands

Bulgaria

Phase

Task
Direction

Situation
Update

Planning

Supporting
Behavior

Information
Exchange

Reinforce/
Punish

Other

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

Beg

21

24.14

13

14.94

29

33.33

0

0.00

21

24.14

1

1.15

2

2.30

87

100.00

Mid

19

21.84

42

48

11

12.64

0

0.00

13

14.94

0

0.00

2

2.30

87

100.00

End

34

38.6

28

31.82

13

14.77

0

0.00

12

13.64

0

0.00

1

1.14

88

100.00

Beg

26

18.44

28

19.86

51

36.17

0

0.00

24

17.02

0

0.00

12

8.51

141

100.00

Majority
IS
Planning
Situation
Update
Task
Direction
Planning
Situation
Update
Situation
Update
Planning
Situation
Update
Situation
Update
Planning
Situation
Update
Situation
Update

Mid

39

27.46

52

36.62

25

17.61

2

1.41

20

14.08

0

0.00

4

2.82

142

100.00

End

44

31.21

67

47.52

1

0.71

2

1.42

14

9.93

7

4.96

6

4.26

141

100.00

Beg

19

14.96

16

12.60

45

35.43

0

0.00

40

31.50

2

1.57

5

3.94

127

100.00

Mid

33

25.78

38

29.69

28

21.88

0

0.00

25

19.53

0

0.00

4

3.13

128

100.00

End

34

26.56

66

51.56

6

4.69

0

0.00

22

17.19

0

0.00

0

0.00

128

100.00

Beg

21

15.79

33

24.81

51

38.35

0

0.00

21

15.79

0

0.00

7

5.26

133

100.00

Mid

37

27.82

59

44.36

15

11.28

1

0.75

15

11.28

6

4.51

0

0.00

133

100.00

End

27

20.30

82

61.65

2

1.50

7

5.26

10

7.52

2

1.50

3

2.26

133

100.00

Beg

15

8.67

20

11.56

86

49.71

0

0.00

19

10.98

4

2.31

29

16.76

173

100.00

Mid

38

21.97

82

47.40

20

11.56

5

2.89

17

9.83

2

1.16

9

5.20

173

100.00

End

28

16.18

111

64.16

0

0.00

0

0.00

18

10.40

6

3.47

10

5.78

173

100.00

Beg

6

18.18

1

3.03

15

45.45

0

0.00

9

27.27

0

0.00

2

6.06

33

100.00

Situation
Update
Situation
Update
Planning

Mid
End

9
8

28.13
24.24

1
6

3.13
18.18

18
14

56.25
42.42

0
0

0.00
0.00

4
3

12.50
9.09

0
1

0.00
3.03

0
1

0.00
3.03

32
33

100.00
100.00

Planning
Planning
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Planning

Team Performance
I examined whether there were mean differences in team performance based on
Nationality of the teams. The results of the Analysis of Variance concluded that there were
mean differences in team performance when analyzed with Nationality as a factor (F (4, 43) =
4.23, p = .01). More information regarding the different Nationality’s team performance data
can be found in Table 18.

Table 18. Descriptives of Team Performance based on Nationality
Variable N
M
SD
Minimum

Maximum

Norway

16

570.00

340.78

0

1150

Sweden

9

760.00

523.62

150

1950

USA

7

1235.71

346.69

900

1690

Netherlands 8

1001.25

249.14

500

1250

Bulgaria

8

746.25

439.77

250

1650

Total

48

803.96

437.13

0

1950

Bonferroni post-hoc analyses were conducted to examine the nature of the mean
differences. I separated the Norwegian senior officer teams from the junior officer teams for the
analyses (F (5, 42) = 4.14, p = .00). The results of the post-hoc analyses clarified the significant
differences among the senior Norwegian, American and the Dutch NATO Officer teams.
Specifically, the American and Dutch teams’ mean performance were significantly greater than
the senior Norwegians’ team performance mean.
.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how culture relates to information
sharing and team performance. To reflect on team research, the Input-Process-Output (I-P-O)
model is often used to examine relations among variables of interest. However, the I-P-O model
was developed with a Western view and this study provided some support to its transfer to other
cultures. In this study, a moderated model of the interactive effects of information sharing and
culture on team performance was examined. Investigating homogeneous teams is not only a
needed study objective for culture research, but it is a prerequisite in understanding how
information sharing is unique within culture. Moreover, in order to understand how to
effectively share information among teammates from various cultures, it is important to
understand how communication is dictated by their native culture. The homogeneous-teams
approach allows researchers to attribute the information sharing patterns to the culture, reducing
the culture confound in heterogeneous teams. Thus, this study provides an examination of
within- and between-culture analysis of team information sharing among teams composed of
NATO Officers.
Information Sharing & Team Performance
As reflected in the extant literature, information sharing was related to team performance.
The results of the data analyses showed that most of the information sharing content areas was
strongly correlated and related to both team performance and culture. Although the total amount
of messages exchanged was significantly related to team performance, the only coded
information sharing dimension that was related to team performance was Situation Update. The
literature suggests that providing and requesting Situation Updates is a direct significant team
process that predicts expert team performance (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001). Research has

85

consistently shown that having information sharing that focuses on the current state of the
mission allows for clarification for team members and for strategy development to increase
effective decision making and performance. Furthermore, consistent situation updates facilitate
more dynamic mission planning, and subsequently improve Warfighter performance. SmithJentsch et al. (2001) suggest that Situation Updates are especially crucial for teams that have to
make critical decisions under extreme time pressures. The NATO Officer population that was
used in this study is one such career field that possesses such team characteristics; therefore, it is
understandable why this relation was significant in this study.
Although the information sharing findings are consistent with the established literature, it
was expected that the other coded information sharing content variables (or at least a subset)
would have demonstrated some statistically-significant relations with team performance as
demonstrated in literature (Rosen, 2005). Yet, when considered in military context, the results
reflect the current military information sharing protocol. As previously stated, team research
conducted in the military, and in similar career fields like the medical community, has
overwhelmingly reported the importance of Situation Update provisions to and requests from
teammates to enhance team performance (Smith-Jentsch, et al., 2001). In fact, many team
training courses, like Team Dimensional Training, in the United States emphasize the importance
of situation updates, especially from junior to senior members. And even though these team
information sharing techniques are trained in the United States, it is interesting that these results
apparently translate to teams from other countries. In this study, the teams that were among the
higher performance scores were those that engaged in situation update during the middle and end
of the mission (e.g., Sweden). The teams composed of senior Norwegian and Bulgarian Officers
were the only teams to not have Situation Update as their most frequent information sharing

86

dimension for the middle and end of the mission. Additionally, these teams had the lowest total
IS (as measured by mean, minimum, and maximum) and are among the lower team performance
scores; thus, these results support the positive information sharing-team performance relations
previously published in the literature.
Cultural Impact
This study underscored that culture mattered. The data analyses conducted for this study
were directed at examining the interactive effects of culture on various information sharing
content areas and team performance, as depicted in Figure 8. The hypothesized relations
involving Power Distance and Individualism were statistically significant. Specifically, Task
Direction had a positive association with team performance for high-Power Distance teams and
the opposite relation for their low-scoring culture counterparts.
Individualists had a tendency to communicate more than those lower on this cultural
scale. Also, positive relations between team performance and Information Exchange and
Reinforcement / Punishment were observed for high-Individualist teams, but negative relations
for teams scoring low on this cultural value. Although these interactions were significant, the
finding regarding Supporting Behavior was in the opposite direction as proposed. It was
hypothesized that information sharing statements targeting supporting behavior would be
positively related to team performance, and that this relation would be exacerbated for those
teams that scored low on Individualism than those that scored high. Instead, the interaction was
indeed significant, but after examining the plot, the data showed that the relation between
Supporting Behavior and Team performance was positive for high-Individualist teams, and
negative for low-Individualist teams. Thus, the results indicate that Supporting Behavior was
associated with inferior team performance for low-Individualist teams. The high Individualists
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engaged in more information sharing and also more Supporting Behavior. Because the low
Individualists engaged in less frequent information sharing, it can be expected that their
information sharing would be focused more on mission planning than on Supporting Behavior.
If the low Individualists used some of their infrequent statements to include Supporting
Behavior, it can be expected that these messages would not substitute other mission-critical
messages; consequently, the information sharing would have a negative relation with team
performance. Additionally, low Individualists engage in more high-context communication and
can be assumed that the Supporting Behavior experienced by such culture would be nonverbal
and not captured in this study.
The interactions involving Uncertainty Avoidance were not statistically significant—
neither Planning nor Situation Update was moderated by this cultural variable. The data suggest
that Planning was not related to team performance and this relation did not change with the
introduction of culture. Situation Update, however, was significantly related to team performance
and Uncertainty Avoidance did not strengthen this relation. The sample size was small (n =48),
providing low power, which possibly prevented statistical significant findings for the
hypothesized relations regarding Uncertainty Avoidance. If there were more teams involved, it
would lend the opportunity to provide more conclusive responses to these hypotheses.
Mission Strategy
When exploring the information sharing differences, there were insightful trends that
facilitated the understanding of differing mission strategies adopted by high- versus lowIndividualists. Although not hypothesized, a distinct pattern of communication over the course
of the task was observed. When the task was divided in three phases, low-Individualists engaged
more in Planning in all three phases, whereas high-Individualists began the task with frequent
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statements about Planning, but used Situation Updates more as time went on. These
communication strategies should be recognized and can also account for why highIndividualists’ performance was superior, as Situation Update was the only information sharing
content that was significantly related to team performance.
Limitations
Although many of the results were as expected, there were some hypotheses and findings
that were not supported. This study only had 48 teams of participants, which could be a
contributing factor to having insufficient statistical power. That is, if there were more
participants and teams involved in the study, the hypotheses regarding Uncertainty Avoidance
and the relations among information sharing and team performance may have resulted in
different statistical findings. However, it should be reinforced that even with a small sample
size, the moderated hypotheses regarding Individualism and Power Distance were observed as
expected—underscoring the strength of these relations.
The cultural values measure by Hofstede has gained much attention by critics for its
development and psychometric properties. The findings from the cultural values analyses would
suggest that the three dimensions (i.e., Individualism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty
Avoidance) that were initially conceptualized as separate constructs, were highly correlated,
inferring that there may be one culture construct. Additionally, in this study, the cultural value
score was assigned to the team based on their nationality. These scores are based on national
levels and eliminate the variability presented by collecting cultural values for each individual and
aggregating these values to represent the team score. Moreover, assigning these team-level
scores that are based on actual national scores reported by Hofstede (www.geert-hofstede.com)
may not reflect the individual cultural values of the participants. For example, to assign a score
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for a participant who is representing the United States prevents the opportunity to measure the
variability in values of those from the four corners of the country. We can assume that the
values of a participant from New York can differ from those of a participant from Mississippi,
Florida, and California. Thus, relying on a national score to represent the cultural values of a
four-participant team may not provide an accurate appreciation of the team culture.
Another limitation related to culture was that the participants involved in this study were
representing countries that scored high on Individualism. Bulgaria was the only country that
could be truly considered low on Individualism. The purpose of this study was not to highlight
team performance differences, but the behavior variations in the information sharing because
hypotheses regarding performance were not considered. It was envisioned that the conclusion of
the study would be that although different cultures communicate differently, they still perform
equally—taking more of a criterion dimensionality approach. Unfortunately, there was
performance differences observed. In general, the individualist countries performed better on this
task than the collectivist. Taken together, in agreement with previous research, information
sharing (specifically, the total frequency and the Situation Update dimension) was related to
team performance. Moreover, these relations were exacerbated for those teams that represented
countries from Individualist cultures. These findings would suggest that Individualists perform
better on team tasks, which seems counterintuitive. However, when scrutinizing the
experimental method and task requirements, this study’s team task is designed to facilitate better
performance from individualist teams more than would be expected from a true collectivist team.
These findings are in accordance with literature on direct and low-context communication. It is
expected that if the task requires participants to solely engage in computer-based text
communication, then those who are more fluent in direct, low-context information sharing (i.e.,
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Individualists) will engage more within said task and will score high in total IS (which was
related to team performance). For more clarification, this task required team members to engage
in direct communication, low-context information sharing that is more aligned with
Individualists’ style. Thus, these results, albeit informative, should be considered with caution
and cannot generalize to any team task in a cross-cultural environment.
Strengths
The participants in this study were NATO Officers from various countries. This study
required the collaboration of many researchers to conduct the experiment in their respective
countries, which underscores its contribution to cross-cultural research. The experiment allowed
researchers to effectively examine how culture is related to information sharing and team
performance.
Although the laboratory task may not be generalizable to real-world tasks and may have
disadvantaged low Individualists by eliminating nonverbals, information sharing expectations in
this task were relevant to the tasking that NATO Officers experience in their job. Moreover, the
task required all teams to type in English (one of NATO’s official languages), even if it was not
their native language. Because the vast majority of communication is non-verbal (Ferraro &
Andreatta, 2010), limiting the information sharing to text-typing provides a deficiency in the
information sharing criterion and facilitates an advantage to low-context cultures. But the digital
age has required teams to rely more on typed communication with email and text messages to
keep abreast on the team task across time zones. Because, much can be lost in translation in
verbal information sharing, it may require teams to engage in more information sharing for
clarification and mission planning. Because the total IS was related in team performance in this
study, this finding supports the need to engage in more text communication in a virtual
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environment. Thus, this team task corresponds to the current state of team information sharing
processes that face our current military demands. Further, this study allows the audience to
understand how cultures differ in information sharing and team performance while considering
the current nature of missions.
Future Research
One major research effort that should be addressed is the lack of an empirically-based
measure of culture. Future research should be directed at developing a more advanced culture
measure that addresses the critiques of the Hofstede measure. Specifically, future research
should be dedicated to understanding the multidimensional concept of culture and developing a
measure that is validated by a globally-representative sample. Moreover, the data from cultural
values presented by Hofstede were highly correlated, which suggests that there are not separate
dimensions but just one measure of culture. Cross-cultural researchers should examine
independent operationalizations of culture that strengthens the current literature on culture.
Similarly, there is a need for more sophisticated, behavior-based information sharing
coding system, especially for digital communication. There should be an emphasis on what
information is unique versus redundant in the team communications. Specifically, researchers
should quantitatively index the ratio of unique to redundant information sharing and how these
messages relate to team performance. There is an expectation that the greater proportion of
unique information that is shared, the better the teams will perform. With a revised information
sharing coding system that measures these messages, the hypotheses in this study can be
readdressed and more clarification of whether culture trumps unique information sharing in
homogeneous teams can be appraised. For example, do high Individualists share more unique
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information than low Individualists? Is Individualism a significant moderator when unique
information is coded?
Team scientists should also consider manipulating the task to include various levels of
interdependency and mission urgency. For example, military missions involving having a
planning meeting with local leaders while drinking chai tea has different information sharing and
culture implications than when the mission is task focused on piloting an unmanned aerial
vehicle for a tactical air strike. The former task has less task interdependency and requires more
cross-cultural competence for success. The latter mission features greater urgency, risk, stress
and time demands that can result in catastrophes if the mission is compromised. With these task
characteristics, the military personnel are dependent less on culture, but on the mission
requirements. It can be hypothesized that under some task conditions, other demographic data
(e.g., rank, education) may trump culture. Thus, future researchers should consider such task
characteristics to provide guidance for what tasks culture matters more and what personal
characteristics are needed.
Future team researchers should also consider developing their studies to collect data at
various levels (e.g., individual, team, and national) to allow for more sophisticated data analyses.
Data analysis techniques like Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) are appropriate for such
studies and are increasingly gaining attention in team research. Using data analysis techniques
that analyze nested variables encourages the understanding of the unique contributions provided
by each level. Researchers should anticipate employing this and other emerging analyses for
nested variables and develop their measures accordingly to advance the team research domain.
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Practical Implications
The results of this study provide practical implications for people who work in similar
careers to the military environments (e.g., first responders, medical teams, etc.). Employees need
to remember the importance of sharing unique information when working in teams. More
information that is shared among the team is related to improved team performance. However,
employees should know that collaborating with team members from other cultures may not be
similar to when working with those from the same culture. These collaborative working
relationships may require trust to facilitate the IS needed for mission success (Hughes, McCoy,
& Johnston, 2009; Hughes, McCoy, Severe, & Johnston, 2010; McCoy-Fisher, Severe, &
Hughes, 2011; McCoy-Fisher, Hughes, & Severe, 2012). Specifically, culturally-distant team
members may engage in indirect, high-context communication that may not be transparent for
Westerners.
Team members should engage in an introduction that allows for teammates to identify
their strengths, weaknesses, and expertise in attacking the team task. In this study, the more
effective teams engaged in Planning in the beginning of the mission, where tasks and roles were
divided. These effective teams did not spend the rest of the mission in Planning mode, but more
in providing or requesting Situation Updates. This orientation in the beginning of the task may
have to occur quickly in the field because of the time pressures associated with their decision
making and mission, but the benefits of this short exchange may serve as a critical force
multiplier in intense missions. This introduction can be compared to having a thorough prebrief, where mission overview, goals, and planning take place—common for military teams.
Finally, more recent technology advancements have been considered by multinational
corporations to augment the high-context environments. Specifically, there has been an increase
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of live virtual feeds of office spaces in various countries which allows the employees to interact
as if they are sharing their daily workspace with their international-counterparts. For example,
there are mobile desks with a screen to project the office in a European location and the ability to
talk directly to team members in a globally-distributed team. With the internet and video
conferencing capabilities, these tools can enhance both high- and low- context communication,
alleviate the ineffective information sharing, and encourage effective decision making.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study highlighted the relations among culture, information sharing,
and team performance and provided support for the transfer of the Western-developed team I-PO model to other cultures. Although total information sharing was related to Team Performance
and culture (Power Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance), Situation Update was
the only coded information sharing variable related to team performance. The effective teams
exchanged more information and teams that were similar in cultural values engaged in similar
information sharing during the beginning, middle, and end of the missions. Additionally,
Individualism and Power Distance were significant moderators for Information Sharing content,
but not Uncertainty Avoidance. Limitations, contributions and practical implications were
discussed along with the look to the future for team research.
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APPENDIX A: INFORMATION SHARING AND CODING SYSTEM
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TYPE

Task Direction

Situation
Update

CONTENT

Definition

1.
Task Action

Statements that include provisions
or requests about instructing team
members of how to proceed in the
task.

2.
Teammate’s
Current Action

Statements that include provisions
or requests about what the
teammate(s) are currently doing in
the mission.

3.
Update on the
Simulation / Task

Statements that include provisions
or requests of recently-acquired
information about the task or
mission.

4.
Progress

Statements that include provisions
or requests about team’s
performance status in the mission.

5.
Roles /
Responsibilities

Statements that include provisions
or requests on how teammate(s)
should divide the team
responsibilities.

6.
Goal setting

Statements that include provisions
or requests about goals for the team
or specific actions team member’s
need to take to address a goal.

Planning
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SABRE Examples
“Go ahead William.”
“Scan it.”
“Let’s move on.”
“Click on dude and give a final
report.”
“Frank or Jacob, pick up the high
fidelity sensor.”
“We will start at 1st and 2nd
avenue.”
“Jacob and Frank will start on 2nd
avenue.”
“He will decide.”
“William, are you still
conscious?”
“Do you have tips you can
share?”
“You can see me on map”
“The purple dot on 2nd street”
“Did you scan the door yet?”
“Did everyone give a final status
report?”
“There can be a bomb.”
“Only one lock pick.”
“Can you unpick the lock?”
“Do you have information about
weapon?”
“Do you need weapon sensor
here?”
“I marked it”
“You just scored 100 goodwill
points”
“Goodwill 1150”
“There are 26 minutes left”
“We will make two teams”
“William and Nathan will be on
team one.”
“You are leader.”
“What are going to be teams?”
“Who is team one?”
“The goal is to search as many
locations as possible”
“The objective is to gain many
gw points”
“What is our goal?”

TYPE

CONTENT

7.
Strategy
Planning
(continued)
8.
Task Option
Generation

Supporting
Behavior

9.
Backup behavior

10.
Agreement

Information
Exchange

11.
Disagreement
12.
Uncertainty /
Indifference
13.
Greetings
14.
Exclamation

Team
Reinforcement
/ Punishment

15.
Positive
Reinforcement /
Positive
Emoticon

Definition
Statements that include provisions
or requests about strategy for task
performance.
These statements are more firm
declarations as compared to Task
Option Generation Statements.
Statements that include provisions
or requests about potential
solutions to a problem. These
statements are more suggestions
and questions rather than Strategy
statements.
Statements that include provisions
of support to team member(s) or
requests for help by team
member(s).
Statements that express agreement
with no rationale provided.
Statements that confirm receipt of
communication.
Statements that express
disagreement with no rationale
provided.
Uncertainty statements explicitly
express either general or specific
uncertainty about the roles, tasks,
situations, or anything else taskrelated.
Statements that focus on
salutations.
Statements that have no
grammatical connection to
surrounding statements and
emphatically expresses emotion.

SABRE Examples
“Okay, so what is our plan?”
“Let one team start from first
avenue.”
“Now, this is our communication
plan. We will communicate by
radio.”

Statements that are positive
comments on the nature of the
experiment, team experience, and /
or team performance.

“Thank you all for participating.”
“It was a pleasure for me to play
with you.”
“You were great.”
“We are a good team.”
“”
“:P”

Statements that are pleasant facial
expressions pictorially represented
by punctuation and letters.
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“Can we start on 3rd avenue and
search in a clockwise direction?”
“I am just suggesting as the team
leader that he is.”
“Should we look in here?”
“We need help”
“Help me”
“Help me with this.”
“Ok.”
“Yes.”
“Got it.”
“I think that you are wrong.”
“No.”
“Heck, I don’t know”
“I don’t care who is on my team.”
“Hi.”
“Good bye”
“!!!”
“?”

TYPE

CONTENT

Team
Reinforcement
/ Punishment
(continued)

16.
Negative
Comments /
Negative
Emoticon

Other

17.
Incomplete /
Filler /
Miscellaneous

Definition
Statements that focus on
expressing negative opinion about
the nature of the experiment, team
experience, and / or team
performance.
Statements that are unpleasant
facial expressions pictorially
represented by punctuation and
letters.
Statements that have no explicit
meaning because they are missing
one or more critical components of
grammar: subjects, verbs, or
objects.
Statements that are words spoken
to fill gaps.
Statements that cannot be coded in
any other category.
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SABRE Examples

“That really sucked.”
“We are terrible!”
“”
“:’(“

“William buddy”
“And you”
“IK”
“Umm”

APPENDIX B: BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE
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The background questionnaire is a pre-game survey. Included below is a screenshot of
the first part of the survey, and then a complete list of the questions and answer choices.

Age
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Sex
Male
Female
What is your nationality?
Norwegian
Swedish
Canadian
American
Dutch
British
Other
If Other, please specify.

How many years have you lived in this country?

How many languages do you speak?

List the languages you speak.

What is the highest degree you have completed?
High School or equivalent
Associate Degree or 2 years after high school
Bachelor's Degree or equivalent
Master's Degree or equivalent
PhD or doctorate equivalent
What is your current military rank (NATO standard)?
OR
OF-1
OF-2
OF-3
OF-4
OF-5
OF-6
OF-7
OF-8
OF-9
Is English your native language?
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Yes
No
How would you rate your ability to read and write in English?
Very Poor
Poor
Functional
Fluent
Very Fluent
Even though you may have a very good command of the English language, how often do
you:

feel that you get more easily stressed when working in an English-speaking environment
rather than in your native language?
Not Applicable
Never
Seldom
Sometimes
Often
Very Often
become more reserved about presenting your point of view in English than in your native
language?
Not Applicable
Never
Seldom
Sometimes
Often
Very Often
Computer and Game Experience

What is your overall level of computer expertise?
Low : Seldom use computers
Medium: Use computers often and are comfortable with them
High : Use computers a lot and feel very comfortable about my abilities
Do you own a computer?
Yes
No
Have you ever used any of the following collaboration tools (check all that apply)
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Email
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly
Don't use
Web Browsers
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly
Don't use
Video Teleconferencing
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly
Don't use
Instant Messaging/Chat
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly
Don't use
Netmeeting/WebEx
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Yearly
Don't use
Do you own or use often any of the following game consoles (check all that apply)?
Playstation 1 or 2
Xbox
Gamecube
Personal Computer
Approximately how many hours per week, if any, do you spend playing computer
games?
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Approximately how many hours per week, if any, do you spend playing multi-player
computer games?

Have you ever played the game Neverwinter Nights?
Yes
No
What computer games, if any, do you most often play?

Have you ever developed any mods for games?
Yes
No
If yes, please list the games:

Thank you!

105

REFERENCES
Adsit, D. J., London, M., Crom, S., & Jones, D. (1997). Cross-cultural differences in upward
ratings in a multinational company. The International Journal of Human Resource
Management, 8, 385-401.
Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.
Bales, R. F. (1950). Interaction Process Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Barrick, M. R., Stewart, G. L., Neubert, M. J., & Mount, M. K. (1998). Relating member ability
and personality to work-team processes and team effectiveness. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 83, 377–391.
Barry, B., & Stewart, G. L. (1997). Composition, process, and performance in self-managed
groups: The role of personality. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 62–78.
BBN Technologies. (2006). Situation Authorable behavior research environment: A gamebased testbed for psychological research (Experimenter’s Guide). Cambridge, MA: BBN
Technologies.
Bioware (2003). Neverwinter Nights for Linux. Retrieved from http://nw.perfectworld.com/.
Bjornstad, A. L. (2008). Organization, culture and group processes in operational and simulated
environments. In Adaptability in coalition teamwork (pp. 12-1- 12-18). Retrieved from
http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-HFM-142.
Blickensderfer, E. L., Reynolds, R., Salas, E., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (Rosen, 2010). Shared
expectations and implicit coordination in tennis doubles teams. Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology, 22, 486-499.
Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and Conformity: A Meta-analysis of Studies Using
Asch’s (1952, 1956) Line Judgment Task. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 111-37.

106

Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. pp. 199-202.
Burnstein, E., & Vinokur, A. (1977). Persuasive argumentation and social comparison as
determinants of attitude polarization. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13,
315-332.
Burke, C.S.; Wilson, K.A.; Salas, E. (2008, April). Varying Team Composition to Examine the
Effect of Cultural Diversity on Team Process and Cultural Adaptability. Adaptability in
Coalition Teamwork, 18-1 -18-14. Paper presented at the RTO Human Factors and
Medicine Panel (Sutton & Gundling, 2005) Symposium, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Retrieved May 17, 2009, from http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MPHFM-142
Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Salas, E. (1998). Making decisions under stress: implications for
individual and team training. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Carr, S. (2004). Globalization and culture at work: Exploring their combined glocality. New
York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Chao, G. T. & Moon, H. (2005). The Cultural Mosaic: A metatheory for understanding the
complexity of culture. Journal of Applied Psychology. 90, 1128-1140.
Cohen, A. B. (2009). Many forms of culture. American Psychologist, 64, 194-294.
Conyne, R. K., Wilson, F. R., Tang, M., & Shi, K. (1999). Cultural similarities and differences in
group work. Group Dynamics: Theory Research and Practice, 3, 40-50.
Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) and
NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological
Assessment Resources.

107

Cramton, C. D. & Orvis, K. L. (2003). Overcoming barriers to information sharing in virtual
teams. In C. Gibson & S. Cohen (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Virtual Teams That Work:
Creating Conditions for Effective Virtual Teams (pp. 214-230). San Francisco, CA:
Jossey Bass.
Department of Defense (2005). Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, November 28, 2005.
Military support for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
Retrieved December 04, 2008 from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.
Doney, P. M., Cannon, J. P., & Mullen, M. R. (1998). Understanding the influence of national
culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23, 601-620.
Driskell, J. E., Goodwin, G. F., Salas, E., O’Shea, P. G. (2006). What makes a good team
player? Personality and team effectiveness. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and
Practice, 10, 249-271. doi: 10.1037/1089-2699.10.4.249.
Elron, E. (1997). Top management teams within multicultural corporations: Effects of cultural
heterogeneity. Leadership Quarterly, 8, 393-412.
Essens, P., & van Loon, T. (2008, April). Cultural challenges in joint and combined command:
A military leader’s perspective. Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork, KN1-1 – KN1-10.
Paper presented at the RTO Human Factors and Medicine Panel (Sutton & Gundling,
2005) Symposium, Copenhagen, Denmark. Retrieved May 17, 2009, from
http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-HFM-142
Ferraro, G., & Andraetta, S. (2010). Cultural anthropology: An applied perspective. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth.

108

Fiske, A. P. (2002). Using individualism and collectivism to compare cultures—A critique of
the validity and measurement of the constructs: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002).
Psychological Bulletin, 128, 78-88.
Fogarty, W. M. (1988). Formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of
Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988 (Invest. Rep. 93-FOI-0184). Department of Defense,
USA.
Gannon, M. J. (1994). Understanding global cultures: Metaphoric journeys through 17
countries. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Gigone, D., & Hastie, R. (Cox, 1993). The common knowledge effect: Information sharing and
group judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 959-974.
Gist, M. E., Locke, E., & Taylor, M. (Carsten & Spector, 1987). Organizational behavior:
Group, structure, process, and effectiveness. Journal of Management, 13, 237-257.
Green, R. (1990). Human error on the flight deck. In D. E. Broadbent, J. Reason, & A. Baddely
(Van Dyne et al., 1995), Human factors in hazardous situations (pp. 503-512). Oxford,
England: Clarendon Press.
Greenhalgh, L., & Chapman, D. I. (1998). Negotiator relationships: Construct measurement, and
demonstration of their impact on the process and outcomes of negotiation. Group
Decision and Negotiation, 7, 465-489.
Grove, C. N. (2005). Professional knowledge center: Introduction to the GLOBE research
project on leadership worldwide. Retrieved from http://www.grovewell.com/pubGLOBE-intro.html

109

Gudykunst, W. B., Matsumoto, Y., Ting-Tooney, S., Nishida, T., Kim, K., & Heyman, S. (1996).
The influence of cultural individual-collectivism, self-construals, and individual values
on communication styles across cultures. Human Communication Research, 22, 510-543.
Gudykunst, W. B., & Mody, B. (2002). Handbook of international and intercultural
communication. London, UK: Sage.
Gudykunst, W. B., & Ting-Toomey, S. (1988). Culture and affective communication. American
Behavioral Scientist, 31, 384-400.
Helmreich, R. L. (2000). Culture and error in space: Implications from analog environments.
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 71, A133-A139.
Henningsen, D. D., & Henningsen, M. L. M. (2007). Do groups know what they don’t know?
Dealing with missing information in decision-making groups. Communication Research,
34, 507-525.
Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal attribution: From cognitive processes to collective beliefs.
Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Retrieved from EBSCOhost.
Hinds, P. J. & Mortensen, M. (2005). Understanding conflict in geographically distributed
teams: The moderating effects of shared identity, shared context, and spontaneous
communication. Organization Science, 16, 290-307.
Hinds, P. J. & Weisband, S. P. (2003). Shared knowledge and shared understanding in virtual
teams. In C.B. Gibson and S. G. Cohen (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Virtual Teams That
Work: Creating Conditions for Virtual Team Effectiveness (pp. 21-36). New York, NY:
Jossey-Bass.

110

Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R., & Vollrath, D. A. (1997). The emerging conceptualization of groups as
information processors. Psychological Bulletin, 121(1), 43-64. doi:10.1037/00332909.121.1.43
Hirokawa, R. Y., & Poole, M. S. (1996). Communication and group decision making. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hollenbeck, J. R., Moon, H., Ellis, A. P. J., West, B., Ilgen, D., Sheppard, L., Porter, C. O. L. H.,
Wagner, J. A. III. (2002). Structural contingency theory and individual differences:
Examination of external and internal person-team ﬁt. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87,
599 – 606.
Hofstede, G. (1984). The cultural relativity of the quality of life concept. Academy of
Management Review, 9(3), 389-398. doi:10.2307/258280
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s Consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and
organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Hofstede, G. (1991). Empirical models of cultural differences. In N. Bleichrodt, P. D. Drenth, N.
Bleichrodt, P. D. Drenth (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Contemporary issues in cross-cultural
psychology (pp. 4-20). Lisse, Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers. Retrieved from
EBSCOhost.
Hofstede, G. (1994). Values Survey Module 1994 manual. University of Limburg, Maastricht,
The Netherlands.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and
organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G. (2006). Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. In W. J. Lonner,
D. L. Dinnel, S. A. Hayes, & D. N. Sattler (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Online readings in

111

psychology and culture, Unit 2: Conceptual, methodological and ethical issues in
psychology and culture. Bellingham: Center for Cross-Cultural Research, Western
Washington University. Available from http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~culture/readings.htm
Hofstede, G., & McCrae, R. R. (2004). Culture and personality revisited: Linking traits and
dimensions of culture. Cross-Cultural Research, 38(1), 52-88.
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Van Dyne et al., 1995).
(2004). Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hughes, S. C., McCoy, C., Johnston, J. H. (2009). Fostering trust within mixed-culture teams:
Challenges and initial recommendations. In J. C. Scarpate & D. P. McDonald (Eds),
Proceedings of 7th Biennial DEOMI Equal Opportunity, Diversity, and Culture Research
Symposium (pp. 497-516). Patrick AFB, FL: Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute.
Hughes, S. C., McCoy, C. E. E., Severe, G. (2010). Cultural influences on trust. In N. A. Stanton
(Ed), Trust in Military Teams: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England.
Hutchins, E. (1990). The technology of team navigation. In J. Galegher, R. Kraut, & C. Egido
(Van Dyne et al., 1995), Intellectual teamwork: Social and technical bases of cooperative
work (pp. 191–220). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ilgen, D. R., Hollenbeck, J. R., Johnson, M., & Jundt, D. (2005). Teams in organizations: From
input-process-output models to IMOI models. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 517–
543.

112

Ilgen, D. R., Lepine, J. A., & Hollenbeck, J. R. (1997). Effective decision making in
multinational teams. In P. C. Early & M. Erez (Van Dyne et al., 1995), New perspectives
on international industrial/organizational psychology (pp. 377–407). San Francisco, CA:
Lexington Press.
Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W., de Luque, M. S., & House, R. J. (2006). In the eye of the
beholder: Cross cultural lessons in leadership from Project GLOBE. Academy of
Management Perspectives, 20, 67-90.
Javidan, M., & House, R. J. (2001). Cultural acumen for the global manager: Lessons from
Project GLOBE. Organizational Dynamics, 29, 289-305.
Jehn, K., Northcraft, G., & Neale, M. (1999). Why differences make a difference: A field study
of diversity, conflict, and performance in workgroups. Administrative Science Quarterly,
44, 741-764.
Johnson, T. E., Lee, Y., Lee, M., O'Connor, D. L., Khalil, M. K., Huang, X., & Brown, L.
(2007). Measuring sharedness of team-related knowledge: Design and validation of a
shared mental model instrument. Human Resource Development International, 10, 437454.
Judge, T. A., & Bono, J. E. (2000). Five-factor model of personality and transformational
leadership. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 751–765.
Kalisetty, S., Kleinman, D. L., Serfaty, D., & Entin, E. E. (1994). Coordination in 48 hierarchical
information processing structures (CHIPS). Proceedings of the 1993 JDL Command and
Control Research Symposium, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
Klein, C., Stagl, K. C., Salas, E., Burke, C. S., DiazGranados, D., Goodwin, G. F., et al. (2007,
April). A meta-analytic examination of team development interventions. Poster presented

113

at the 22nd Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational
Psychology (SIOP), New York.
Klein, H. A. (2004). Cognition in natural settings: The cultural lens model. In M. Kaplan (Ed.)
Cultural Ergonomics, Elsevier Science, Ltd.
Klein, H. A. & Steele-Johnson, D. (2002). Training cultural decentering. Technical Report
completed for the U.S. Army Research Institute.
Kluckhohn, C. K. (1951). Values and value orientations in the theory of action: an exploration in
definition and classification. In T. Parsons & E. A. Shils (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Toward
a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Knouse, S. B. (2001). Diversity and shared team mental models in the military. Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute.
Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Bell, B. S. (2003). Work groups and teams in organizations. In W. C.
Borman, D. R. Ilgen, & R. J. Klimoski (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Handbook of psychology:
Industrial and organizational psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 333–375). London, UK: Wiley.
Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Ilgen, D. R. (2006). Enhancing the effectiveness of work groups and
teams. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 7, 77–124.
Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Klein, K. J. (2000). A multilevel approach to theory and research in
organizations: Contextual, temporal, and emergent processes. In K. J. Klein & S. W. J.
Kozlowski (Eds), Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations:
Foundations, extensions, and new directions (pp. 3–90). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Kroeber, A. & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions. New
York: Meridian Books.

114

Langan-Fox, J., Code, S., & Langﬁeld-Smith, K. (2000). Team mental models: Techniques,
methods, and analytic approaches. Human Factors, 42, 242–271.
LePine, J. A., Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D., & Hedlund, J. (1997). Effects of individual
differences on the performance of hierarchical decision-making teams: Much more than
g. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 803– 811.
Letsky, M., Warner, N., Fiore, S., & Smith, C. A. P. (2010). Macrocognition in teams: Theories
and methodologies. Hants, UK: Ashgate.
Lichacz, F. (2008, April). A preliminary examination of the impact of cultural differences on
situation awareness and confidence in a simulated multinational headquarters.
Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork, 16-1 -16-14. Paper presented at the RTO Human
Factors and Medicine Panel Symposium, Copenhagen, Denmark. Retrieved May 17,
2009, from http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-HFM-142
Lumsden, C. J. (1989). Does culture need genes? Ethology & Sociobiology, 10, 11-28.
Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion,
and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253.
Mathieu, J. E., Heffner, T. S., Goodwin, G. F., Salas, E., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (2000). The
influence of shared mental models on team process and performance. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 85, 273-283.
Martin, E., Lyon, D. R., & Schreiber, B. T. (1998). Designing synthetic tasks for human factors
research: An application to uninhabited air vehicles. In Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society 42nd Annual Meeting (pp. 123–127). Santa Monica,
CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

115

Matsumoto, D. (2003). The discrepancy between consensual-level culture and individual-level
culture is an important aspect of culture. Culture and Psychology, 9(1), 89-95.
Matsumoto, D. (Hughes et al., 2009). Cross cultural adaptation. In Proceedings of the 7th
biennial EO, diversity, and culture research symposium. Patrick Air Force, Fl: Defense
Equal Opportunity Management Institute. Retrieved from
http://www.deomi.org/EOEEOResources/documents/Cross-Cultural_AdaptationMatsumoto.pdf.
Matsumoto, D., & Juang, L. (2007). Culture and psychology (4th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Matsumoto, D., & Yoo, S. H. (2006). Toward a new generation of cross-cultural research.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 234-250
McComb, S. A. (2007). Mental model convergence: The shift from being an individual to being
a team member. In F. Dansereau & F. J. Yammarino (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Multi-level
issues in organizations and time (Vol. 6, pp. 83–147). Amsterdam, NL: Elsevier.
McCoy-Fisher, C., Hughes, S., & Severe, G. (2012). Setting the stage for 3C: Trust and
affectivity. Symposium panel presentation at the 27th Annual Meeting of the Society for
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, San Diego, CA.
McCoy-Fisher, C., Severe, G., & Hughes, S. (2011). The influence of Cross-Cultural
Competence on trust building for the U.S. Military. Symposium panel presented at the
Annual Convention for the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.
McGinn, G. H., Weaver, N. E., McDonald, D. M., van Driel, M., Hancock, P. A. (2008, April).
Strategic perspectives on developing language, regional, and cultural capabilities.
Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork, 1-1 - 1-12. Paper presented at the RTO Human

116

Factors and Medicine Panel (Sutton & Gundling, 2005) Symposium, Copenhagen,
Denmark. Retrieved May 17, 2009, from
http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-HFM-142
Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & DeChurch, L. A. (2009). Information sharing and team performance:
A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 535-546.
Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and the development of everyday social explanation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 961-978.
Mohammed, S., & Dumville, B. C. (2001). Team mental models in a team knowledge
framework: Expanding theory and measure across disciplinary boundaries. Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 22, 89–103.
Morgan, B. B., Jr., Coates, G. D., Kirby, R. H., & Alluisi, E. A. (1984). Individual and group
performances as functions of the team-training load. Human Factors, 26, 127–142.
Morgan, B. B., Glickman, A. S., Woodward, E. A., Blaiwes, A. S., & Salas, E.,
(1986). Measurement of team behaviors in a Navy environment (Tech. Report No. NTSC
TR-86-014). Orlando, FL: Naval Training Systems Center.
Motowildo, S. J. (2003). Job performance. In W. C. Borman, D. R. Ilgen, & R. J. Klimoski (Van
Dyne et al., 1995), Comprehensive handbook of psychology: Vol. 12. Industrial and
organizational psychology (pp. 39–53). New York, NY: Wiley.
Myers, D. (2005). Social psychology (8th ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
Naikar, N., Pearce, B., Drumm, D., & Sanderson, P. M. (2003). Designing teams for ﬁrst-of-akind, complex systems using the initial phases of cognitive work analysis: Case study.
Human Factors, 45, 202–217.

117

Naylor, Y. K., & Amazeen, E. L. (2004). The size-weight illusion in team lifting. Human
Factors, 46, 349–357.
Neuman, G. A., & Wright, J. (1999). Team effectiveness: Beyond skills and cognitive ability.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 376 –389.
Neuberg, S. L., Judice, T. N., & West, S. G. (1997). What the Need for Closure Scale measures
and what it does not: Toward differentiating among related epistemic motives. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1396-1412.
Neuberg, S. L., & Newsom, J. T. (1993). Personal Need for Structure: Individual differences in
the desire for simple structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 113131.
Orasanu, J., & Salas, E. (1993). Team decision making in complex environments. In G. A. Klein,
J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Decision making
in action: Models and methods (pp. 327-345). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishers.
Paulus, T. M., Bichelmeyer, B., Malopinsky, L., Pereira, M., & Rastogi, P. (2005). Power
distance and group dynamics of an international project team: A case study. Teaching in
Higher Education, 10, 43-55.
Pfeiffer, J. (1989, July). The secret of life at the limits: Cogs become big wheels. Smithsonian.
Porter, C., Hollenbeck, J. R., Ilgen, D. R., Ellis, A., West, B. J., & Moon, H. (2003). Backing up
behaviors in teams: The role of personality and legitimacy of need. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 88, 391– 403.
Poole, M. S., & Roth, J. (1989). Decision development in small groups V: Test of a contingency
model. Human Communication Research, 15, 549-589.

118

Reynolds, S. & Valentine, D. (2004). Guide to Cross-Cultural Communication. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Riedel, S. L. (2008). Communication. In A. R. Febbraro, B. McKee, & S. L. Riedel (Van Dyne
et al., 1995) Multinational military operations and intercultural factors. Retrieved from
http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-TR-HFM-120.
Rifkind, L.J., & Harper, L.F. (1993). Competent verbal and nonverbal cross gender immediacy
behaviors. CUPA Journal, 44, 47-54.
Riopelle, K., Gluesing, J. C., Alcordo, T. C., Baba, M. L., Britt, D., McKether, W., Monplaisir,
L., Ratner, H. H., & Wagner, K. H. (2003). Context, task, and the evolution of
technology use in global virtual teams. In C. B. Gibson & S. G. Cohen (Van Dyne et al.,
1995), Virtual teams that work: Creating conditions for virtual team effectiveness (pp.
239-264). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Rosen, M. (Rosen, 2010). Collaborative problem solving: The role of team knowledge building
processes and external representations (Rosen, 2010). Retrieved from
http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/CFE0003109/Rosen_Michael_A_201005_PhD.pdf.
Ross, M., Xun, W. Q. E., Wilson, A. E. (2002). Language and the bicultural self. Personality
and Social Psychology, 28, 1040-1050.
Salas, E., Burke, C., Wilson-Donnelly, K. A., and Fowlkes, J. (2004). Promoting effective
leadership within multicultural teams: An event-based approach. In D. V. Day, S. J.
Zaccaro, & S. M. Halpin, (Van Dyne et al., 1995) Leader development for transforming
organizations: Growing leaders for tomorrow (pp. 293-323). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

119

Salas, E. Cannon-Bowers, J.A., Church-Payne, S., & Smith-Jentsch, K. A. (1998). Teams and
teamwork in the military. In C. Cronin (Ed.), Military Psychology: An Introduction (pp.
71-87). Needham Heights, MA: Simon & Schuster.
Salas, E. Cooke, N. J., & Rosen, M. A. (2008). On teams, teamwork, and team performance:
Discoveries and developments. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society, 50, 540-547.
Salas, E., Dickinson, T. L., Converse, S. A., & Tannenbaum, S. I. (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).
Toward an understanding of team performance and training. In R.W. Swezey, E. Salas
(Eds), Teams: Their training and performance (pp.3-29). Westport, CT: Ablex
Publishing. Retrieved from EBSCOhost.
Salas, E., & Fiore, S. M. (2004). Team cognition: Understanding the factors that drive process
and performance. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Salas, E., Fowlkes, J. E., Stout, R. J., Milanovich, D. M., & Prince, C. (1999). Does CRM
training improve teamwork skills in the cockpit? Two evaluation studies. Human
Factors, 41, 326–343.
Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L. (1995). Situation awareness in team
performance: Implications for measurement and training. Human Factors, 37, 123–136.
Salas, E., Prince, C., Bowers, C. A., Stout, R. J., Oser, R. L., & Cannon-Bowers, J. A. (1999). A
methodology for enhancing crew resource management training. Human Factors, 41,
161–172.
Salas, E., Stagl, K. C., Burke, C. S., & Goodwin, G. F. (2007). Fostering team effectiveness in
organizations: Toward an integrative theoretical framework of team performance. In R.
A. Dienstbier, J. W. Shuart, W. Spaulding, & J. Poland (Van Dyne et al., 1995),

120

Modeling complex systems: Motivation, cognition and social processes: Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 51, pp. 185–243). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press.
Schittekatte, M., & Van Hiel, A. (1996). Effects of partially shared information and awareness
of unshared information on information sampling. Small Group Research, 27, 431-449.
Schwartz, S. H. (1996). Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated value
systems. In C. Seligman, J.M. Olson, & M.P. Zanna (Van Dyne et al., 1995), The
psychology of values: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 8 (pp.1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Serfaty, D., Entin, E. E., and Johnston, J. H. (1998). Team Coordination Training. In J.A.
Cannon-Bowers and E. Salas (Van Dyne et al., 1995)., Making Decisions Under Stress.
American Psychological Association: Washington, DC. pp. 221-245.
Shiraev, E., and Levy, D. (2007). Cross Cultural Psychology (3rd ed). New Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson/Allyn Bacon.
Smith, E. (2010, February 5). NATO forces recapture vessel seized by pirates. Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/02/05/indian.ocean.pirate.rescue/index.html?ir
ef=allsearch
Smith, P. B. (1992). Organizational behavior and national cultures. British Journal of
Management, 3, 39-51.
Smith, K. (2008). Empirical studies and an explanatory model of cultural differences in goal
setting, task allocation, and communication. In Adaptability in coalition teamwork (pp.
23-1 – 23-18). Retrieved from http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MPHFM-142.

121

Smith, P. B., & Bond, M. H. (1999). Social psychology across cultures. Boston, MA: Allyn and
Bacon.
Smith, P. B., & Bond, M. (Cox, 1993). Social psychology across cultures: Analysis and
perspectives. Hertfordshire, HP2 7EZ England: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Retrieved from
EBSCOhost.
Smith, P. B., Peterson, M. F., & Misumi, J. (1994). Event management and work team
effectiveness in Japan, Britain, and USA. Journal of Occupational and Organizational
Psychology, 67, 33-43.
Smith, P. B., Peterson, M. F., & Schwartz, S. H. (2002). Cultural values, sources of guidance,
and their relevance to managerial behavior. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33,
188-208.
Smith, H. J., & Tyler, T. R. (1997). Choosing the right pond: The impact of group membership
on self-esteem and group-oriented behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
33, 146-170.
Smith-Jentsch, K. A., Campbell, G. E., Milanovich, D. M., Reynolds, A. M. (2001). Measuring
teamwork mental models to support training needs assessment, development, and
evaluation: Two empirical studies. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 179-194.
Smith-Jentsch, K. A., Mathieu, J. E., & Kraiger, K. (2005). Investigating linear and interactive
effects of shared mental models on safety and efficiency in a field setting. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 90, 523-535. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.90.3.523
Spector, P., Cooper, C. L., & Sparks, K. (2001). An international study of the psychometric
properties of the Hofstede Values Survey Module 1994: A comparison of individual and

122

country/province level results. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 50, 269281.
Stahl, G. K., Mäkelä, K., Zander, L., & Maznevski, M. (2010). A look at the bright side of
multicultural team diversity. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 26, 439-447.
Stahl, G. K., Maznevski, M. L., Voigt, A., & Jonsen, K. (2010). Unraveling the effects of
cultural diversity in teams: A meta-analysis of research on multicultural work groups.
Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 690-709.
Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision making:
Biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 48, 1467-1478. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.48.6.1467
Sutton, J.L., & Gundling, E. (2005). Enabling Cultural Adaptability. In C.A. Rodriguez & R.
Poisson (Chairs) Strategies to maintain combat readiness during extended deployments –
A human systems approach. Symposium conducted at the HFM-124/RSY, Prague, Czech
Republic. NATO RTO. Paris.
Sutton, J. L., & Pierce, L. G. (2003). A framework for understanding cultural diversity in
cognition and teamwork. Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control
Research and Technology Symposium. Retrieved from http://www.dodccrp.org/
8thICCRTS/Pres_track1.htm.
Thompson, M. (2008, April). Individual difference theory and research: Applications to
multinational coalition teamwork. Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork, KN2-1 – KN228. Paper presented at the RTO Human Factors and Medicine Panel (Sutton & Gundling,
2005) Symposium, Copenhagen, Denmark. Retrieved May 17, 2009, from
http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-HFM-142

123

Thompson, M. M., Naccarato, M. E., Parker, K. H., & Moskowit, G. B. (2001). The personal
need for structure and personal fear of invalidity measures: Historical perspectives,
current applications, and future directions. In G. B. Moscowitz (Ed.) Cognitive social
psychology: The Princeton Symposium on the legacy and future of social cognition (pp.
19-39). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Ting-Toomey, S. (1988). “Intercultural Conflicts: A Face-Negotiation Theory.” In Y. Y. Kim &
W. B. Gudykunst (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Theories in Intercultural Communication (pp.
213-235). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Tönnies, F. (1887). Gemeinschaft und gesellschaft (Community and society). Michigan State
University Press.
Tönnies, F. (2002). Community and society (C. P. Loomis, Ed. & Trans.). Devon, UK: Dover
Publications. (Original work published in 1887; original translation published in 1957)
Trafimow, D., Silverman, E. S., Fan, R. M. T., & Law, J. S. F. (1997). The effects of language
and priming on the relative accessibility of the private self and the collective self.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28, 107-123.
Triandis, H. C. (1976). Variations in black and white perceptions of the social environment.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Triandis, H. C., Vassiliou, V., Vassiliou, G., Tanaka, Y. and Shanmugam, A. (1972). (Van Dyne
et al., 1995) The analysis of subjective culture. New York: Wiley.
Triandis, H. C. (1986). Collectivism vs. individualism: A reconceptualization of a basic concept
in cross-cultural psychology. In C. Bagley, & G. Verma (Van Dyne et al., 1995)
Personality, Cognition, and Values: Cross-cultural perspectives of childhood and
adolescence. London, UK: Macmillan.

124

Triandis, H. C. (2000). Collectivism and individualism. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of
psychology, Vol. 2 (pp. 176-179). American Psychological Association.
doi:10.1037/10517-066
Triandis, H. C. (2004). Dimensions of culture beyond Hofstede. In H. Vinken, J. Soeters, & P.
Ester (Eds), Comparing cultures: Dimensions of culture in a comparative perspective
(pp. 28-42). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
Triandis, H. C., Vassiliou, V., Vassiliou, G., Tanaka, Y., & Shanmugam, A. V. (1972). The
analysis of subjective culture. New York, NY: Wiley.
Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (2005). Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C.
(2005). Riding the waves of culture: Understanding cultural diversity in business. United
Kingdom: Nicholas Brealey.
Van Hook, S.R. (2000). Cross-cultural variances in team effectiveness. Jones International
University. Available online at http://wwmr.us/teams.htm.
Van Meer, J. P., Veldhuis, G. J., & Schwerzel, J. (2008, April). Bridging the culture gap: A
cultural framework as a basis for cultural awareness training. Adaptability in Coalition
Teamwork, 5-1 - 5-18. Paper presented at the RTO Human Factors and Medicine Panel
(Sutton & Gundling, 2005) Symposium, Copenhagen, Denmark. Retrieved May 17,
2009, from http://www.rta.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-MP-HFM-142
van Vliet, A. J., & van Amelsfoort, D. (2008). Multinational military teams. In A. R. Febbraro,
B. McKee, & S. L. Riedel (Van Dyne et al., 1995), Multinational military operations and
intercultural factors (pp. 4-1 - 4-16). NATO Research and Technology Organisation.
Retrieved from http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/TR/RTO-TR-HFM120///TR-HFM-120-04.pdf.

125

Weiss, A., Costa, Jr., P. T., Karuza, J., Duberstein, P. R., Friedman, B., & McCrae, R. R. (2005).
Cross-sectional age differences in personality among medicare patients aged 65 to 100.
Psychology and Aging, 20, 182-185. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.20.1.182.

126

